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Foreword
At Crisis we know from our services that supporting people into work is crucial to help 
individuals move on permanently from homelessness. However, over recent years we’ve been 
increasingly concerned that sanctions, rather than helping people secure employment, may 
instead be pushing them further from the labour market. Yet there has been little in the way of 
robust evidence examining the impact on homeless people.
This report ills that major gap in the evidence. It is the largest study of its kind ever carried out, 
drawing on the experiences of 1,000 people using homelessness services across the country.
The report identiies an overwhelming motivation to work amongst homeless people and those 
at risk of homelessness, despite having high support needs, alongside widespread support for 
the principle of conditionality in the beneits system. It shows that in order to help homeless 
people secure employment, it is vital to capitalise on this aspiration and goodwill, but that sadly 
in practice this often doesn’t happen and sanctions are imposed instead. Worryingly, the most 
vulnerable within this cohort– including care leavers and those with mental health problems– 
are at the greatest risk of being sanctioned.
The report also identiies serious failings in the support provided to vulnerable jobseekers by 
Jobcentre Plus and Work Programme providers. The indings suggest that people are being 
sanctioned because they cannot comply with conditionality requirements and not because 
they will not comply. Too often unreasonable demands are being placed of them because their 
needs and circumstances are being overlooked. 
Some of the indings are shocking. They paint a grim picture of people being made homeless 
and even being forced to sleep rough as a result of beneit sanctions. The report inds those 
already homeless going hungry and being forced to ‘beg, borrow and steal’ – this is both 
inhumane and counter-productive.
Finding and sustaining work is a key route out of homelessness. This report provides clear 
evidence that the current system needs reform to ensure homeless people are adequately 
supported into work. As the current Work Programme contracts draw to a close, we want to 
see Government make a irm commitment to identify and help homeless people and those at 
risk of homelessness from an early stage, across all statutory employment support services. 
We hope the Government will use the evidence in this report to ensure that homeless people 
are able to secure employment and rebuild their lives.
Jon Sparkes
Chief Executive, Crisis
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Introduction
This report presents the indings from a study 
commissioned by Crisis and conducted by 
the Centre for Regional Economic and Social 
Research at Shefield Hallam University to 
explore the prevalence and experience of 
beneit sanctions amongst homeless people. 
The report was commissioned in response 
to growing concerns and evidence that 
homeless people may be disproportionately 
affected by sanctions, and about whether 
the regime is being fairly and appropriately 
applied to vulnerable groups.
The report is based on evidence from a 
face-to-face survey with 1013 homelessness 
service users and in-depth interviews with 42 
homelessness service users who had been 
sanctioned in the past year. Fieldwork took 
place between February and July 2015.
Context
In 2012, as part of a wider programme of 
welfare reform, the Coalition Government 
introduced a new system of welfare 
conditionality that places greater responsibilities 
on wider range of claimants and imposes 
harsher sanctions against those who fail to 
comply. Underpinned by the view that rights 
must be balanced by responsibilities the 
core objective of welfare reform, and the 
sanctions regime speciically, is to support 
more people into work. Such a programme 
of reform is deemed necessary to tackle the 
problems of beneit dependency and cultures 
of worklessness reported to exist amongst 
those who are out of work.
Most notable of the changes introduced 
as part of the new regime are enhanced 
requirements placed on claimants - including 
setting job-search and other targets - and 
increased severity and length of sanctions. 
Some claimants can have their beneit 
withdrawn for up to three years if they do not 
meet the requirements placed upon them.
Key Findings
• The evidence points to high levels of 
labour market detachment amongst 
homelessness service users. A signiicant 
proportion of survey respondents were 
not ‘it for work’, had health issues that 
limited the work they could do, and had 
last worked more than ive years ago. 
However, a signiicant minority did have a 
recent work history and the vast majority 
wanted to work, in some cases despite 
having been assessed as unit to do so. 
This positive disposition towards working 
was relected in respondents’ efforts to 
ind work and improve their skills and 
employability, often independent of 
Jobcentre Plus requirements.  In fact, 
many of the homelessness service users 
participating in this research had just the 
kind of disposition to work that welfare 
policy seeks to engender. 
• There was widespread support for 
a system of conditionality amongst 
respondents interviewed in-depth despite 
the fact that all had fallen foul of this 
system and been sanctioned.
• Results from the survey corroborate 
the scant, but emerging evidence base 
on sanctions and homelessness, 
suggesting that homelessness service 
users are disproportionately affected 
by sanctions. In fact, they may be twice 
as likely to be sanctioned as the wider 
claimant population. In total, 39 per cent of 
the survey sample had been sanctioned in 
the past year. 
• Vulnerable claimants such as those as 
those with mental ill health, dependency 
issues, and poor literacy issues  
appear most adversely affected  
by the conditionality and sanctions 
regime. They are more likely to face 
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dificulties meeting conditionality 
requirements; more likely to be sanctioned; 
and more likely to report negative impacts 
of being sanctioned. 
• The evidence suggests that it is systemic 
and personal barriers to meeting 
conditionality requirements that 
explain the high sanction rate amongst 
homelessness service users rather 
than unwillingness to comply. Key 
barriers include: the requirement to job 
search online combined with homeless 
peoples limited access to the internet; 
personal circumstances and vulnerabilities 
limiting capability to meet requirements; 
insecure postal addresses; the ‘full time 
job’ of managing the many personal 
issues and commitments many homeless 
respondents have combined with limited 
lexibility in the beneits system; and the 
complexities of the system, compounded 
by unclear communication and processes. 
Only a very small minority of interview 
respondents had been sanctioned for 
wilfully failing to comply with conditionality 
requirements. Rather, they made 
honest mistakes, they had not received 
notiication of appointments, were ill, or 
were set conditions clearly not appropriate 
to their capabilities. The majority (63 per 
cent) of survey respondents found the 
conditionality requirements placed upon 
them dificult to meet. This suggests 
that homelessness service users are 
being sanctioned because they cannot 
comply with conditionality requirements 
and not because they will not comply.
• The conditionality imposed on 
respondents raised questions about 
consistency of practice in relation to 
vulnerable people. Some respondents 
with poor IT proiciency and no access to 
the internet were required to conduct most 
or all of their job-seeking online (and were 
sanctioned for failing to do so) while others 
with higher levels of proiciency were 
allowed to use other methods, such as 
looking in newspapers, asking friends and 
family and handing out CVs.
• Universal Jobmatch appeared to be 
yielding no meaningful opportunities for 
participants in this study. They reported 
extremely low success rates (hundreds 
of jobs applied for with no interview 
secured or response of any kind received), 
hardly ever receiving a curtesy response 
to applications and jobs remaining 
on the website for months, arousing 
suspicion that they were not genuine and 
undermining trust in the system. These 
experiences had a demotivating effect for 
respondents, many of whom were already 
relatively low on self-esteem.
• Respondents valued highly the support, 
courses, and volunteering opportunities 
offered by voluntary sector organisations 
with which they were engaged but 
their views and experiences of support 
provided by Jobcentre Plus and the Work 
Programme was much more mixed. 
Respondents’ experiences of the help 
and support provided through the 
beneit system were so variable it is 
dificult to draw any conclusions about the 
merits and effectiveness of the different 
components of in-system support. Some 
gave high praise for a course they were 
referred to, while others said theirs gave 
them no new skills; some described 
helpful and understanding Work Coaches, 
while others reported being treated 
with disdain and offered nothing they 
recognised as help and assistance  
to ind work.
• The  evidence from this study suggests 
that the sanctions regime does prompt 
some behavioural change, making 
homelessness service users more 
likely to comply with the conditions set 
down for them, where they are able 
to. However, most respondents reported 
already doing all they could to meet their 
conditionality requirements.
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• Being sanctioned was found to have 
a series of ‘unintended’ impacts on 
respondents’ lives, pushing them into 
debt, hunger, straining relationships 
with friends, family and children and 
exacerbating mental and physical 
health problems in an already vulnerable 
population. Three quarters of the survey 
respondents who had been sanctioned 
said this had a negative impact on their 
mental health
• There is evidence that being sanctioned 
is having a signiicant detrimental 
impact on people’s housing situations 
– those already homeless and those in 
their own accommodation – resulting in 
homelessness for some. Overall 21 per 
cent of sanctioned respondents said 
they became homeless as a result of 
the sanction. This is partly due to Housing 
Beneit sometimes ceasing when a 
claimant is sanctioned. 
• Perversely, the experience and 
detrimental impact of sanctions was 
found to push  people further from the 
labour market, or decrease their chances 
of securing work, in direct opposition to 
the policy intent. 
• The study found that homelessness 
service users were ‘begging borrowing 
and stealing’ to meet their daily needs 
while sanctioned. For example, 38 per 
cent of sanctioned survey respondents 
had stolen essential items as a result of 
being sanctioned. Going without essentials 
such as food (77 per cent) and heating (64 
per cent) was also commonplace. Many 
were turning to voluntary and charitable 
support services to ill the gap left by the 
withdrawal of welfare beneit income. The 
majority, for example, had visited a food 
bank (61 per cent) as a way of meeting 
their daily needs while sanctioned.
Policy Implications 
These results have signiicant implications 
for policy. It is clear that, however 
well-intentioned the conditionality and 
sanctions regime and associated support 
and assistance, it is not working well for 
homelessness service users. In particular:
• The policy rationale for sanctions is that 
they encourage compliance. In other 
words, they are a deterrent threat, not a 
punishment. The very high sanction rate 
amongst homelessness service users 
indicated by this study suggests that 
sanctions are certainly not working or 
being employed as a ‘deterrent threat’.  
• The sanctions system is premised upon 
the notion that some individuals need 
coaxing to engage in work related activity. 
However, willingness to engage with 
the system, support for a conditionality 
regime, and aspirations to work were 
strong amongst those participating in 
this study. The evidence shows that 
respondents often did make more 
concerted efforts to comply following 
a sanctioning - for example checking 
appointment times more carefully, 
recording job search activity more 
rigorously - but their disposition and 
attitude was unchanged because they 
were already positively disposed to take 
advantage of support and training, and 
seek work.
• DWP policy and guidance makes clear 
that ‘any work related requirements 
placed on claimants should be 
personalised according to their needs 
and circumstances, taking into account 
any restrictions.’ This stipulation 
does not appear to be enforced. The 
requirements detailed in respondents’ 
Claimant Commitment documents were 
frequently seemingly impossible to meet 
and inconsiderate of their constrained 
circumstances. In some cases, a sanction 
was more or less inevitable.
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• Many sanctions occurred not because 
of ‘behavioural failings’ on the part of 
claimants, but because of systemic 
problems and inappropriate requirements 
that far exceeded respondents’’ 
capabilities and circumstances.  
Yet behaviour change - a key objective  
of the sanctions regime - cannot low  
from a policy that people are unable to 
comply with.
• The beneit system is designed to protect 
the most vulnerable, and support people 
into work. The evidence from this studies 
calls into question how far these policy 
aspirations are being met
Summary Recommendations
We suggest that for a system of conditionality 
to be effective for this client group, to 
promote genuine efforts to help homeless 
people move closer to the labour market 
and achieve their aspirations, and to mitigate 
against the unintended consequences of 
sanctioning the following changes and 
measures are required.
1. DWP must ensure sanctions do not 
result in claimants’ Housing Beneit 
being stopped, and report on progress in 
resolving this issue
2. Conditionality requirements should  
be suspended until housing issues  
are resolved:
 > DWP should extend the current 
‘easement’ rules on conditionality to 
anyone who is homeless, until their 
housing situation is resolved. 
 > Work Coaches should be required 
to ascertain whether an individual is 
homeless or at risk of homelessness so 
that the easement can be applied. 
3. Work Coaches and contracted providers 
should exercise greater leniency when 
inancial sanctions are likely to put  
an individual at risk of homelessness  
or destitution
 > DWP should introduce a new inancial 
assessment for Jobcentre Plus decision 
makers to deliver before a inancial 
sanction can be issued. 
 > Contracted providers of employment 
support programmes should be  
given greater freedoms not to  
raise a doubt over a sanctionable 
offence when deemed inappropriate to 
supporting a homeless person  
into work; and DWP should issue 
guidance on what might constitute  
a ‘vulnerable’ person.
 > DWP should introduce a ‘warning 
system’ for a irst failure to comply 
with conditionality requirements 
for claimants with a history of 
homelessness, in place of a sanction. 
4. Employment support and conditionality  
requirements should be better tailored  
for people who are homeless or at risk  
of homelessness
 > The DWP commissioning framework, 
and future devolved commissioning 
models in Scotland and via city 
deals, should incorporate an in-depth 
assessment process that  
takes into account the barriers 
homeless people, or those at risk of 
becoming homelessness, face. 
 > DWP should introduce a uniform 
set of service standards across 
Jobcentre Plus and contracted out 
provision to ensure high quality 
services are delivered and homeless 
people receive the support needed to 
overcome speciic barriers to work.
 > Providers of employment support 
provision, including Jobcentre 
Plus, should include housing and 
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homelessness specialists within their 
delivery model. 
 > DWP guidance on the Claimant 
Commitment should clearly state that 
jobseeking activities should be co-
designed between the claimant and 
Work Coach, and reviewed on an 
ongoing basis. 
 > Work Coaches and contracted 
providers should capitalise on the 
positive efforts claimants are already 
making to improve employability by 
supporting their engagement with the 
voluntary sector to access support, 
courses or volunteering opportunities.
5. DWP must fully evaluate the effectiveness 
of conditionality and sanctions in moving 
people into the labour market
 > DWP should commission a review 
of the effectiveness of the current 
conditionality and sanctions 
regime, including evaluation of the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of 
the regime in supporting homeless 
claimants into work.
 > DWP should formally report on progress 
in meeting the recommendations of the 
Oakley review.
 1. Introduction 1
In 2012 the Coalition Government introduced 
a new system of welfare conditionality and 
sanctions that places greater responsibilities 
on a wider range of claimants and sanctions 
more harshly for failure to comply. There has 
been growing concern in the homelessness 
sector about the impact of this new regime 
on homeless people and evidence has 
begun to emerge that homeless and other 
vulnerable groups may be disproportionately 
affected by sanctions. This has raised 
questions about whether the new regime is 
being fairly and appropriately applied. 
Responding to these questions and concerns, 
Crisis commissioned a team from the Centre 
for Regional Economic and Social Research 
(CRESR) at Shefield Hallam University, in 
conjunction with Qa Research, to conduct 
a study exploring the experience and 
prevalence of sanctions amongst homeless 
people. The irst output from the study - a 
scoping paper reviewing oficial statistics and 
evidence about sanctions and homelessness  
was published in March 2015. This report 
represents the second output from the study, 
detailing the results from a survey of 1,013 
homelessness service users and in-depth 
interviews with 42 homelessness service 
users who have been sanctioned. The 
results raise some serious questions about 
the appropriateness, effectiveness, and 
consequences of conditionality and sanctions 
as applied to homeless people. 
1.1 Policy context1
Conditionality, backed by sanctions, has 
been a feature of the British social security 
system since the late 1980s. However, in 
2010, the incoming Coalition Government 
pressed ahead with plans set in train by 
the previous Labour administration for a 
programme of welfare reform that placed 
conditionality and responsibility at the heart 
of welfare policy. As part of these reforms 
a new, harsher conditionality and sanctions 
regime was introduced in the Welfare Reform 
Act 2012. 
Underpinned by the view that rights must 
be balanced by responsibilities, and that no 
one should get ‘something for nothing’, the 
core objective of welfare reform generally, 
and the sanctions regime speciically, is to 
support more people into work - or, in the 
words of the Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions ‘to get Britain working again.’2 Such 
a programme of reform is deemed necessary 
to tackle the problems of beneit dependency 
and cultures of worklessness reported to 
exist amongst those who are out of work as 
Lord Freud, now Minister for Welfare Reform, 
explained in a speech in December 2011:
That’s what the welfare revolution is all 
about - that’s the inal goal - to bring an 
end to long-term beneit dependency and 
begin a cultural transformation.3
Other associated changes in the beneit system 
include: the requirement on lone parents to 
actively seek work once their youngest child 
reaches the age of ive and some conditionality 
imposed on those receiving certain sickness 
beneits, for whom receipt of beneit has 
previously been unconditional. 
1.2 Overview of the current 
sanctions regime
There are myriad of welfare beneits in the 
UK but for the purposes of this report we 
need only focus on the two main ‘out of 
work’ beneits for working age adults:4 Job 
Seeker’s Allowance (JSA) for people who are 
1. Introduction
1  See the scoping report from this study for a fuller discussion of the policy context, which can be found here http://www.crisis.org.uk/data/iles/
publications/Sanctions%20Report%202015_FINAL.pdf
2  Speech delivered by Iain Duncan Smith on 7 April 2014, Hosted by Business for Britain at Pimlico Plumbers, London https://www.gov.uk/
government/speeches/jobs-and-welfare-reform-getting-britain-working 
3 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-welfare-revolution
4  https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-welfare-revolution
it for work, and Employment and Support 
Allowance (ESA) for those not it for work. 
ESA claimants go through an assessment 
phase which includes a ‘Work Capability 
Assessment’ and are placed into one of two 
categories: the ‘Work-Related Activity Group’ 
(WRAG), for people assessed as capable 
of taking steps towards moving into work; 
and the Support Group for those deemed 
incapable of ‘work-related activity’.5 Receipt 
of beneits is unconditional for those in the 
ESA Support Group or assessment phase 
but JSA claimants and ESA claimants in 
the WRAG have to comply with certain 
conditions in order to receive their beneit. If 
they fail to do so they can be sanctioned by 
having their beneit withdrawn.
JSA claimants are subject to much higher 
levels of conditionality than those in the ESA 
WRAG, with an expectation that claimants 
undertake ‘such steps as he can reasonably 
be expected to have to take in order to have 
the best prospects of securing employment’.6 
ESA claimants in the WRAG are subject to 
lower levels of conditionality but are required 
to participate in mandatory interviews or 
undertake speciied work related activity. 
Conditionality requirements on JSA and ESA 
WRAG claimants have increased markedly in 
the past few years. A key component of the 
increased conditionality is the new ‘Claimant 
Commitment’, a personalised document 
which sets out the speciic requirements 
that a claimant must meet in order to receive 
their beneit. The Claimant Commitment can 
specify the number of jobs a claimant must 
apply for each week and the number of hours 
they must spend job searching7, and specify 
courses or training they must attend. This 
may include referral to the Work Programme 
(a ‘welfare-to-work’ programme that is 
contracted out to external providers to deliver 
training, assistance and work experience) for 
JSA claimants and for ESA WRAG claimants 
if they have a prognosis of being ready to 
work within the year. 
Sanctions (i.e. withdrawal of beneit) may 
be imposed if a claimant fails to meet their 
conditionality requirements. The Welfare 
Reform Act 2012 introduced a marked 
increase in the severity and the length 
of sanctions than can be imposed. Most 
notable of the changes are: 
• Reorganisation of the previous system 
of sanctions and disentitlements into 
three categories of sanction (higher, 
intermediate and lower) depending on the 
nature of the ‘failure’ 
• The introduction of different levels of 
sanctions for irst, second, and third 
‘failures’ with the penalty increasing with 
each ‘failure’
• A marked increase in the severity 
of sanctions. JSA claimants can be 
sanctioned for between four and 13 weeks 
for the irst failure and up to three years for 
the third. ESA WRAG claimants receive an 
open-ended sanction followed by a ixed 
period sanction of one week, two weeks or 
four weeks when they re-comply. 
No claimant group subject to conditionality 
is exempt from sanctions. However, in July 
2013 new rules were introduced giving 
Jobcentre Plus advisors discretionary 
power to exempt some homeless claimants 
from requirements to be available for work, 
actively seeking work, or to participate in the 
Work Programme. This ‘easement’ can be 
applied to homeless people in a ‘domestic 
emergency’, providing they are taking 
reasonable action to ind accommodation.8
5 Although it is possible to be in part time work and claim JSA. 
6  ESA claimants, along with a range of other working age beneits are gradually being subsumed with a new beneit: ‘Universal Credit’ (UC). 
However, the implementation of UC has been a slow process, and so, although some unemployed claimants have moved onto UC, it still makes 
sense to talk about JSA and ESA. The conditionality requirements and sanctions regime under discussion here are in line with those for UC.
7  Section 7 of the Jobseekers Act 1995: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1995/18/section/7 
8  These conditions would only be imposed on JSA claimants as ESA claimants are not expected to actively seek work.
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If a claimant disagrees with the sanction 
they can ask for it to be ‘reconsidered’ by a 
Decision Maker. If the decision to apply the 
sanction is upheld the claimant can then 
appeal to Her Majesty’s Court and Tribunal 
Service (HMCTS). Since October 2013 
mandatory reconsideration takes place for 
any claimant who disputes a decision before 
it can be appealed at tribunal. 
There are a few features of the conditionality 
and sanctions system emphasised by the 
Government that are worth noting, for these 
indicate how the system is intended to operate:
• According to the Government, sanctions 
are intended to encourage compliance. 
In other words, they are intended to be a 
deterrent threat rather than a punishment. 
• The guidance is clear that requirements 
for all claimants must be ‘reasonable, 
designed to help the claimant move 
into work, and relecting the claimant’s 
particular capability and circumstances’9
• Sanctions (i.e. withdrawal of beneit) may 
be imposed if a claimant fails to meet their 
conditionality requirements, but only if 
they have done so without good reason. 
In other words, sanctions should only 
be imposed against those who do not, 
or who refuse to comply, not those who 
cannot comply. The Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions made this clear when 
he said ‘that is why we are developing 
sanctions for those who refuse to play by 
the rules.’10
The most recent statistics released by DWP 
show that in the year to March 2015 587,000 
sanctions were applied to JSA claimants 
before reconsiderations and appeals (506,502 
after) and 43,300 to ESA WRAG claimants 
(33,353 after reconsiderations and appeals). 
This represents an average monthly sanction 
rate of 5.5 per cent of JSA claimants (4.7 
per cent after reconsiderations and appeals). 
The monthly sanction rate for ESA WRAG 
claimants is substantially lower at 0.7 per 
cent before reconsideration and appeals 
and 0.6 per cent after.11 There has been 
a downward trend in the number of JSA 
sanctions since the peak in the year ending 
October 2013, relecting a fall in the number 
of JSA claimants as the economy continued 
to recover. The rate of sanctions also fell 
slightly compared to the previous year. The 
number of ESA WRAG sanctions also fell 
over the period.12
1.3 About the research
Following a scoping phase where evidence 
and statistics about sanctions and 
homelessness were reviewed, the main 
stage of this study was conducted between 
January and September 2015. Data collection 
focused on two key tasks: a survey of single 
homeless people of working age; and in-
depth interviews with homeless people 
who are being or who have recently been 
sanctioned. These are detailed further below. 
These datasets were also supplemented 
with formal and informal discussions with 
stakeholders throughout the duration of the 
project including frontline workers, managers 
and policy oficers in homelessness services 
and charities, in local authority Housing 
Beneit departments, in services working with 
young people and unemployed people, and 
housing providers. 
Survey of single homeless people of 
working age
The survey was conducted in day centres 
for homeless people and in homeless 
hostels in 21 towns and cities in England 
9  http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2014/1623/pdfs/uksi_20141623_en.pdf
10  DWP (2014) Government’s response to the Independent review of the operation of Jobseeker’s Allowance sanctions validated by the Jobseek-
ers Act 2013, London: Department for Work and Pensions.
11  Speech at the Launch of ‘Universal Credit: welfare that works’, November 11th 2010, London https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/
universal-credit-welfare-that-works 
12  Webster, D. (2015) Brieing: the DWP’s JSA/ESA Sanctions Statistics Release, 12 Aug 2015. http://www.cpag.org.uk/david-webster
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and Scotland. These were Birmingham, 
Bootle, Bradford, Brighton, Bristol, 
Edinburgh, Glasgow, Grimsby, Hull, London 
(boroughs of Westminster and Lambeth), 
Lancaster, Leamington Spa, Leeds, Leicester, 
Manchester, Newcastle, Perth, Rotherham, 
Salford, Shefield and York. The intention was 
not to generate a database which could be 
analysed by geography - the numbers would 
not have been large enough to do so - but to 
ensure that homeless people living in different 
housing, demographic and geographical 
contexts were included, and that the sample 
was not skewed unduly by speciic or unique 
conditions in certain types of places. 
Screening questions were included at the 
start of the survey to screen out anyone who 
was not of ‘working age’ in beneit terms (i.e. 
aged 65 or over) or who was not eligible for 
beneits because of their immigration status. 
People not currently homeless were eligible 
to participate on the basis that their use of 
a homelessness service indicated a recent 
history of homelessness, a very precarious 
housing situation, or threat of homelessness. 
In total, 1,013 single homelessness service 
users aged 16-64 were surveyed face-to-
face between February and April 2015. The 
general demographic characteristics of the 
sample were: 82 per cent were male and 18 
per cent were female; 14 per cent were aged 
25 or under, 65 per cent were aged 26 to 
49 and 22 per cent were 50 or over. In total, 
548 respondents (54 per cent) were subject 
to conditionality. All survey respondents 
received a £5 ‘thank you’ payment.
In-depth interviews with single 
homelessness service users
Interviews were conducted with 42 
homelessness service users who were 
currently being or had recently (within the 
past year or so) been sanctioned. Interviews 
were conducted in seven of the towns 
and cities in which surveying had taken 
place. These were: Birmingham, London, 
Manchester, Shefield, Rotherham, Edinburgh 
and Glasgow. Respondents were identiied 
through the survey, or through services which 
had taken part in the survey. 
Interviewing took place between February 
and June 2015, involving 35 men and seven 
women. Several respondents had moved 
between JSA and ESA (Support Group, 
WRAG, and those in the assessment phase), 
as well as not claiming at all or being on 
Incapacity Beneit or Income Support, and 
so it is dificult to provide a clear proile 
of the claimant group but the sample was 
not unduly skewed towards JSA or ESA 
claimants. Efforts were also made to include 
people of different ages, with a good spread 
across each age group. 
The interviews were qualitative, making use of 
a broad topic guide rather than a structured 
interview schedule. Respondents were 
asked to talk through their experience of 
claiming beneits and of interacting with the 
beneit system, they were asked about their 
employment history and aspirations, or other 
work-related activity they were undertaking, 
about their housing situations and other life 
experiences, and about how they managed 
while they were sanctioned. Interviews 
were recorded with the permission of the 
respondent and fully transcribed and coded 
and analysed using NVivo. All respondents 
were given £15 to thank them for their time.
The research team made efforts to keep in 
touch with respondents who had recently 
been sanctioned (approximately 10 in total) 
to follow their experiences over time. Contact 
was intermittent and it proved impossible to 
maintain contact with everyone but it allowed 
the research team to gather information 
about some respondents’ experiences over a 
longer timeframe. 
In this report, all respondents’ names have 
been changed with the exception of one, who 
asked that his real name be used.
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Welfare policy is premised on the view that 
the majority of people should work, should be 
provided with support to enable them back 
into work, and that vulnerable individuals 
unable to do so should be protected. The 
research was therefore interested in 
exploring respondents’ experiences of and 
engagement with the labour market and their 
attitude to work. Respondent attitudes are 
important because, as discussed in Chapter 
1, the Government insist that sanctions are 
imposed on those who wilfully fail to comply 
with conditionality requirements, those 
whose ‘culture of worklessness’ leaves them 
unwilling and unmotivated to seek work. 
We will see in this chapter that although 
most of the homelessness service users 
participating in this research were not 
employed, and many had been out of work 
for some time, a strong desire to work 
was evident, support for the principle of 
conditionality and sanctions was strong, a 
signiicant cohort had a recent employment 
history, and many were already making 
concerted efforts - sometimes independent 
from Jobcentre Plus requirements - to gain 
skills and employment.
2.1 Welfare beneits 
Of the 1,013 people surveyed, 92 per cent 
were currently claiming beneits and an 
additional 2 per cent had claimed in the 
past year. These respondents were asked if 
they were currently claiming any of the main 
working age out-of-work beneits:
• 35 per cent were claiming Job Seekers 
Allowance (JSA)13
• 56 per cent were claiming Employment 
Support Allowance (ESA) comprised of:
1. 22 per cent who reported being subject to 
conditionality (the Work-Related Activity 
Group [WRAG])
2. 33 per cent who reported not being not 
subject to conditionality (the Support 
Group or those in the assessment phase)14 
3. 2 per cent were currently claiming 
Incapacity Beneit
4. 5 per cent were currently claiming Income 
Support
5. 4 per cent were not currently claiming any 
of the above.15
Sanctions are only applied to people claiming 
JSA or who are in the Work-Related Activity 
Group of ESA. Table 2.1 compares the proile 
of survey respondents claiming JSA or 
ESA with the JSA/ESA claimant population 
of Great Britain. This suggests that 
homelessness service users are more likely to 
be in conditionality groups with 63 per cent 
subject to conditionality compared with 42 
per cent of the equivalent British claimant 
population. A higher proportion of our survey 
respondents also indicated that they were 
in the Work-Related Activity Group of ESA 
than nationally. This is surprising given the 
relatively high levels of mental and physical ill 
health and substance misuse issues recorded 
in the homeless population. 
More than half of all those surveyed (548 
respondents; 54 per cent) reported being 
subject to conditionality requirements. 
These 548 respondents are the main focus 
2. Proiling labour market engagement and 
dispositions to work
13  See the scoping report from this study for a fuller analysis of the oficial sanction statistics:   http://www.crisis.org.uk/data/iles/publications/
Sanctions%20Report%202015_FINAL.pdf
14  Only ive respondents, or 0.5%, of the full sample were claiming UC. For the purposes of reporting in this document the ive UC respondents 
have been subsumed within the JSA group. At the time of publication only claimants considered it for work were being put onto UC.
15 These categories are not mutually exclusive and a small number of respondents indicated receipt of more than one beneit.
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of this report - people using homelessness 
services who are or have recently been 
subject to conditionality and, therefore, 
potentially subject to sanctions. 
2.2 ‘Fitness’ for work
Of the survey respondents claiming beneits, 
more than half were in receipt of sickness 
beneits (ESA and Incapacity Beneit) and 
amongst those subject to conditionality a 
signiicant proportion (39 per cent) were 
claiming ESA. ESA is only paid to claimants 
who have been assessed by DWP as not 
currently it for work and so it is not surprising 
that a signiicant proportion of respondents 
subject to conditionality reported having a 
physical health problem or disability (40 per 
cent) or mental health issues (45 per cent). 
Physical or mental ill health and disabilities 
do not preclude people from working. 
However, thinking speciically about how their 
health impacted on capacity to work, 44 per 
cent of respondents subject to conditionality 
said their health did limit the amount or type 
of work they could do ‘a lot’ or ‘quite a bit’ 
(see Table 2.2). As might be expected, three 
quarters of ESA WRAG claimants reported 
health issues that limited the work that they 
could do by ‘a lot’ or ‘quite a bit’, but health 
was also a barrier to work for just over a 
quarter of JSA claimants. We will see later 
in the report that a host of other issues 
also affect homelessness service users’ 
capabilities with regard to work, including 
their housing situation, literacy, and other 
support needs. 
2.3 Employment history
Very few respondents were working at the 
time they were surveyed and, relecting 
their health issues (see above), housing 
circumstances, and other support needs 
many were relatively detached from the 
labour market. Table 2.3 shows that only 15 
respondents in the full sample were in regular 
paid work and that 41 per cent of the full 
sample and 35 per cent of those subject to 
conditionality last had a regular job over ive 
years ago.
GB claimant population, Feb 
2015 (n=3,028,700) %
Survey of homelessness service 
users, Feb 2015 (n=867) %
JSA 26 38
ESA WRAG 16 25
ESA Support Group and 
assessment phase
58 37
Total 100 100
Table 2.1. Proportion of JSA and ESA claimants
Table 2.2. In your opinion, does your health limit the type or amount of work you can do? 
Source: Survey data and DWP Working Age Claimant Group
 ESA WRAG % JSA % All subject to conditionality  %
A lot 47 15 27
Quite a bit 26 11 17
Just a little 10 12 11
Not at all 15 61 43
Don’t know 1 1 1
Total 100 100 100
Base 548
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However, a signiicant minority did have a 
recent work history, particularly amongst 
those subject to conditionality. One in ive, for 
example, had worked in the past year and 
an additional 13 per cent had a regular job 
between one to two years ago. Thus, one-
third of respondents subject to conditionality 
had worked in the past two years while more 
than half had worked in the past ive years. 
2.4 Efforts to seek work and move 
closer to the labour market
The vast majority of interview and survey 
respondents wanted to work, in some cases 
despite having been assessed as unit to 
do so. In total, 88 per cent of all survey 
respondents said they wanted a job now (51 
per cent) or in the future (37 per cent). This 
includes respondents who were not currently 
well enough to work, with 41 per cent of ESA 
WRAG claimants saying they would like a job 
now. A further 50 per cent said they would 
like a job in the future. 
Interview respondents with work histories 
were keen to emphasise their past 
experience, usually to demonstrate their 
willingness to work and their capabilities: 
I’m not a lazy person, I do my work, I can 
work, I was running my business all by 
myself from 6am in the shop cooking ready 
for 12 and I’ll be closing 10 in the night 
every day, Sunday to Sunday. (Benjamin)
I was a chef, I used to be able to jump out 
of one kitchen and straight into another 
kitchen within a couple of days so I was 
laughing, six months in one job and then 
I’ll go to Newquay or go to this place or 
this place, jump straight into a restaurant, I 
used to work in [X restaurant], I ended up 
buying [it] when I were younger with my 
ex-partner when my son irst were born, so 
I’ve had my own restaurants. (Ja)
Interview respondents’ desire to have a job 
was relected in their efforts to ind work and 
improve their skills. Those who could work 
(and some of those less able) were keen to 
secure employment, develop their skills and 
undertake training to improve their position 
in the labour market. As Sonia and Anisa 
explained: 
I just want to get a job so I can get out and 
pay my own rent…I go and ask people at the 
jobcentre, it’s usually me asking if they’ve got 
something else for me to go. (Sonia)
I would really want to do a course cos that 
would at least get me doing something 
in the day. It’s stressful cos you’ve got so 
much time on your hands. (Anisa)
Table 2.3. Approximately when did you last have a regular job?
Subject to conditionality % All respondents %
I have one now 1 1
Less than 1 year ago 20 16
≥ 1 but less than 2 years ago 13 11
≥ 2 but less than 5 years ago 22 19
5 or more years 36 41
Never had a regular job 8 10
Don’t know 1 1
Total 100 100
Base 548 1,013
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Independently from requirements placed 
upon them by Jobcentre Plus many 
respondents signed up for educational and 
training courses, were working with voluntary 
sector providers to write CVs and improve 
their skills, and were handing out CVs and 
using social and familial networks to seek 
work. These efforts were rarely recognised 
by Work Coaches16 as ‘counting’ towards 
respondents’ conditionality requirements - an 
issue we pick up in more detail in Chapter 4.
In total, 64 per cent of respondents subject to 
conditionality had educational or vocational 
qualiications leaving around one-third with 
no qualiications.17 Respondents were adept 
at identifying, and taking steps to address, 
educational or skills gaps disadvantaging 
them in the current labour market. Thus Fred, 
who described himself as computer illiterate, 
recognised that computer skills had become 
essential in today’s labour market and signed 
up for a basic computer skills course. Similarly, 
Maggie had some previous experience in retail 
- work she had enjoyed and hoped to make 
a career of - and so completed a City and 
Guilds qualiication in retail management in the 
hope of giving herself an advantage over other 
job applicants. 
2.5 Attitudes toward conditionality
There was widespread support amongst 
the 42 in-depth interview respondents 
for the principle of conditionality, with 
most thinking it right that people should 
‘earn’ any beneits they received. It is 
worth remembering here that all interview 
respondents had been sanctioned. By virtue 
of this, all had negative experiences of the 
beneit system and might be expected to 
be more inclined against the system of 
which they had fallen foul. Yet the following 
comments were typical:
I think they should [have conditionality] 
it shouldn’t be free money coz everyone 
else is out there working and paying tax. I 
used to pay tax so I know what it’s like. You 
need to put the effort, you can’t just get 
something for free when you’re not putting 
something back. (Kyle)
If you’re on beneits you’ve got to do some 
sort of stuff to get paid or sort yourself 
out, cos at the end of the day it’s just easy 
money really, if you stay on beneits any 
longer you’re just going to get comfortable 
with it ain’t you. Basically I’m only on JSA 
to ind work. I don’t want to be on it but I 
have to be on it. (David)
Yes I do agree with it, cos Joe Bloggs could 
just go down, make a claim, do absolutely 
nothing looking for work and think it’s free 
money. So in a way to have conditions put 
onto people is good. (Dennis)
Hence, despite the dificulties that individuals 
encountered in practice (see Chapter 4), 
there was general willingness to accept 
conditionality requirements and to make 
concerted efforts to meet these. 
In fact, ive interview respondents potentially 
eligible for ESA chose to claim JSA 
instead, going ‘above and beyond’ what 
was expected of them in their willingness 
to look for a job. Stuart, for example, had 
been encouraged by a voluntary sector 
organisation to apply for ESA but decided not 
to do so because ‘to me that’s an easy way 
out, people would use that to get out of the 
situation of having to do these job searches.’ 
This is despite being sanctioned several 
times, accruing considerable rent arrears as 
a result and being evicted from his tenancy. 
Jonathan, who had been on ESA previously 
following a serious illness that left him with 
16   All JSA and ESA claimants are assigned a Work Coach who supports them to undertake work-related activity.
17   A similar proportion of all respondents and respondents not subject to conditionality had educational or vocational qualiications.
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lung damage, explained his rationale for 
choosing to move to JSA in similar terms:
…they have asked me why don’t I go on 
ESA but I choose not to go on it cos I feel 
I’m it for work. ESA is for somebody who 
really needs it, I don’t need it. I meet the 
criteria to have it but I were on ESA before, 
it’s too easy and you sit at home all day…
At least with JSA you’re active, you can go 
and do stuff…I want to work, I don’t want 
to be in the situation I’m in now and be out 
of work. (Jonathan)
Kyle, who was discharged from the army 
with post-traumatic stress disorder and 
encouraged to apply for ESA did not wish 
to place limits on his search for work either, 
believing there was work he could do with 
his mental health issues and that sickness 
beneits should only be for those ‘who really 
need it’. Maggie and Sonia, meanwhile, were 
so keen to work that they too applied for JSA 
despite being advised that poor health would 
prevent them from being able to comply with 
the JSA system: 
My doctor said I should have gone straight 
on ESA but…I thought ESA I’d be stuck in 
the house being on the sick and I couldn’t 
do with that at the time cos I thought 
it would keep my mind going so I still 
claimed JSA and thought I’d be all right. 
(Maggie)
I was getting told about ESA, workers here 
and workers there, and for ages they were 
telling me to go on the sick, before all this 
[sanctions] happened, and I was saying 
no cos I just want to get into a routine and 
I’m scared if I leave it longer and longer it’s 
going to be harder and harder. (Sonia)
Respondents’ interactions with Jobcentre 
Plus and the Work Programme, and their 
efforts to meet conditionality requirements are 
discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5. 
2.6 Key points
• 94 per cent of survey respondents were 
claiming beneits or had done in the past 
year, 35 per cent of whom were currently 
claiming JSA and 56 per cent of whom 
were currently claiming ESA.
• The survey results indicate that homeless 
claimants may be more likely to be 
in conditionality groups - JSA and 
ESA WRAG - than the wider claimant 
population. This is somewhat counter 
intuitive given the relatively high 
prevalence of issues such as mental 
and physical ill health and substance 
abuse in this population, although the 
predominance of men in the survey 
sample (who are more likely to claim JSA 
than women) will partly explain this. 
• The survey evidence points to high levels 
of labour market detachment amongst 
homelessness service users. A signiicant 
proportion were not ‘it for work’ or had 
health issues that limited the work they 
could do, and around half of the survey 
sample had last had a job more than ive 
years ago, including 10 per cent who had 
never worked. 
• However, a signiicant minority did have a 
recent work history, particularly amongst 
those subject to conditionality (over one-
third of whom had worked regularly in 
the past two years) and a strong desire 
to work was clearly evident. In total, 88 
per cent of all survey respondents said 
they wanted a job now or in the future, 
including those deemed unit for work. 
This general disposition towards working 
was relected in interview respondents’ 
efforts to ind work and improve their skills 
and employability. 
• There was widespread support for 
a system of conditionality amongst 
respondents interviewed in-depth despite 
the fact that all had fallen foul of this 
system and been sanctioned recently.
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Of the 548 survey respondents subject to 
conditionality (i.e. those to whom a sanction 
could be applied), 39 per cent had been 
sanctioned in the past year (JSA 38 per 
cent; ESA WRAG 40 per cent). One in 10 
respondents were sanctioned at the time they 
were surveyed (JSA 12 per cent; ESA WRAG 
6 per cent). By comparison, a Freedom of 
Information request in the year 2013/14 
revealed that 18 per cent of all JSA claimants 
were sanctioned in that year.19 This suggests 
that homelessness service users claiming 
JSA may be twice as likely to be sanctioned 
as the JSA claimant population as a whole.
A comparable annualised igure is not 
available for sanctions amongst ESA WRAG 
claimants20 but the monthly sanction rate 
is lower than for JSA claimants. The similar 
sanction rate amongst ESA WRAG and 
JSA claimants in our survey suggests the 
prevalence of sanctions amongst homeless 
ESA WRAG claimants is greater than twice 
the rate of this claimant group as a whole.
The majority (60 per cent of those who had 
been sanctioned) had been sanctioned once 
in the past year but a signiicant proportion 
(around 40 per cent) had been sanctioned 
more than once. By comparison, a Freedom 
of Information request revealed that in the year 
to June 2014 30.9 per cent of all sanctioned 
JSA claimants had been sanctioned more 
than once suggesting that homeless claimants 
may be more likely to experience multiple 
sanctions.21 
Consistent with the survey indings, it was 
common for interview respondents to have 
multiple sanctions imposed over the course 
of a year, sometimes with only short periods 
in between where beneit was paid. 
The oficial sanctions statistics do not include 
details of claimants’ housing situations and 
so no robust data exist about the numbers 
of homeless people who are sanctioned. 
Evidence is beginning to emerge suggesting 
that vulnerable people, and homelessness 
service users in particular, may be 
disproportionately affected by sanctions.18 
However, existing evidence is scant and 
sometimes anecdotal. 
In response, a key aim of this study was to 
generate a robust estimate of the proportion 
of homeless people who are sanctioned 
though a survey of homelessness service 
users. The results, presented in this chapter, 
lend much support to the evidence already 
accumulating that homeless and vulnerable 
people are more likely to be sanctioned than 
the wider claimant population. 
In addition to looking at the prevalence 
of sanctioning, this chapter draws on 
qualitative interviews to explore the reasons 
why homelessness service users are 
sanctioned. A series of case studies shows 
that respondents were rarely sanctioned for 
wilfully refusing to comply with conditionality 
requirements, an issue we explore in more 
detail in Chapter 4. 
3.1 How many homelessness 
service users are sanctioned?
DWP emphasise that sanctions exist to 
encourage compliance. In other words, 
they are a deterrent threat, rather than a 
punishment. If effective, deterrent threats 
need not be used extensively. Yet evidence 
from this study suggests that signiicant 
numbers of homelessness service users are 
being sanctioned. 
18   See http://www.crisis.org.uk/data/iles/publications/Sanctions%20Report%202015_FINAL.pdf for a review of the evidence about sanctions and 
homelessness:
19  FOI 2014-4972, found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ile/402593/4972-2014.pdf
20 The FoI request only applied to JSA claimants. We submitted an equivalent request for ESA WRAG claimants on 27th May 2015 but at the time 
of writing had not received the information requested.  
21 FOI 2014-4972, found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ile/402593/4972-2014.pdf
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3.2 Proile of homelessness service 
users who are sanctioned
In terms of demographic characteristics, 
there were no signiicant differences between 
respondents who had been sanctioned and 
those who had not although, consistent 
with the proile of the wider sanctioned 
population, they were slightly younger. 
However, respondents sanctioned in the past 
year were more likely to belong to vulnerable 
sub-groups, than were those who had not 
been sanctioned. For example, amongst 
the sample of respondents subject to 
conditionality:
• Those who had been in local authority care 
were more likely to have been sanctioned 
in the past year than those who had never 
been in care (49 per cent and 36 per cent 
respectively)
• Those with mental ill health were more 
likely to have been sanctioned in the past 
year than those without mental ill health 
(45 per cent and 34 per cent respectively 
with slight but not stark differences 
between JSA and ESA WRAG claimants) 
• JSA claimants with alcohol or drug 
dependency issues were more likely to 
have been sanctioned in the past year 
than those without (47 per cent compared 
with 33 per cent), although the same was 
not true for ESA WRAG claimants.
3.3 Why are homelessness service 
users sanctioned?
Amongst survey respondents subject to 
conditionality the most common reasons for 
a sanction were:
• Not signing on (28 per cent of JSA 
claimants)22
• Not turning up for a work-focused 
interview (20 per cent, with little difference 
between JSA and ESA WRAG claimants); 
with a further 8 per cent of sanctioned JSA 
claimants and 7 per cent of sanctioned 
ESA WRAG claimants sanctioned for 
being late for an appointment, a work-
focused interview or to sign on 
• Not doing the required job search activity 
(19 per cent of JSA claimants).
However, these broad statistics reveal 
nothing about the circumstances in which 
respondents breached their Claimant 
Commitment; failed to attend appointments, 
were late, or not active enough in their job 
search. We do know that 82 per cent of 
sanctioned survey respondents felt they 
had a good reason for failing to meet the 
condition for which they were sanctioned. 
If we look in detail at the circumstances under 
which respondents interviewed in-depth 
were sanctioned, this rather high percentage 
begins to make sense. A summary of 
the reasons why each in-depth interview 
respondent was sanctioned is presented 
Appendix 1 and Box 3.1 presents ive of 
these cases in more detail. In a small number 
of cases respondents were not clear why they 
were sanctioned, or the circumstances were 
so convoluted it was dificult to ascertain 
with clarity or certainty the reason for their 
sanction. In 36 of the 42 cases, however, it 
was possible to discern the circumstances 
under which respondents were sanctioned. 
Exploring the circumstances resulting in 
these 36 respondents being sanctioned, most 
fell into one of ive categories:
1.  Impossible to comply: for example not 
receiving notiication of an appointment, 
or being ill or in hospital. A total of six of 
the 36 interview respondents reported not 
receiving the letters that informed them 
of appointments they were subsequently 
sanctioned for missing. A further three 
were too ill to attend their appointment, 
one of whom (Luke) was in hospital at the 
time. Helena meanwhile, could not attend 
22  ESA WRAG claimants are not required to sign on
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her appointment because the information 
about the location was missing from her 
letter. She requested this information 
and the letter was sent again without the 
relevant details.
2.  Making an impossible choice: 
for example having another crucial 
appointment or commitment at the 
same time as a Jobcentre Plus or Work 
Programme appointment. Lewis, for 
example, had a job interview that clashed 
with his appointment, and Fred had to 
look after his daughter at short notice. 
Melanie was being evicted from a hostel 
on her signing date. Respondents in these 
situations usually made efforts to contact 
their advisor in advance or as soon as 
possible to explain their predicament.
3.  Oversight and misunderstanding: 
for example making an honest mistake 
about the time or date of an appointment 
or misunderstanding conditions and 
requirements. Eight respondents could be 
placed in this category. Anisa and Ross 
made innocent mistakes about the time or 
location of their appointments while Kyle 
and Thomas simply forgot theirs. Brian, 
Pete, Alistair and Simon all misunderstood 
(or, perhaps, in the case of Brian were 
misinformed about) their obligations, in 
the case of Simon and Pete because of 
numeracy and literacy dificulties. These 
‘mistakes’ were often made in an otherwise 
unblemished record and sometimes 
because other distracting personal 
issues had arisen (family bereavement, 
relationship and housing problems). 
Respondents nearly always contacted 
Jobcentre Plus or the Work Programme as 
soon as they realised their mistake. 
4.  Support needs such as mental ill health, 
learning disability or drug and alcohol 
problems limiting capacity to comply: 
for example, as in William’s case, where 
requirements were clearly not appropriate 
to his circumstances and capabilities. This 
was also true for Tim and Shawn and 
would apply to Maggie’s second sanction. 
Tim and Maggie were subsequently 
deemed unit for work and awarded ESA. 
We have already mentioned above that 
Simon and Pete found compliance dificult 
because of poor literacy and numeracy.
5.  Refusing to engage in work-related 
activity: only two respondents fell clearly 
into this category. Joe had support 
needs that limited his capabilities but (in 
contrast to others such as Tim and Shawn 
mentioned above) Joe made no effort to 
seek work. It is worth noting that Joe was 
subsequently deemed unit for work and 
awarded ESA. Amrit refused to attend the 
Work Programme despite being capable of 
doing so.
In addition, there is a relatively large group 
of respondents who had actively sought 
work but could not prove they had done so, 
or who had done so in a way not endorsed 
by their Work Coach. Graham, for example, 
was sanctioned (twice) for failing to apply for 
the requisite number of jobs. He had, in fact, 
applied for enough jobs each time to meet 
his Claimant Commitment but: 
…you’ve got Universal Jobmatch on the 
computer and they can tell on the computer 
how many jobs you’ve applied for and I told 
her I’d applied for jobs in other areas, Jobs.
com, other things and she said that wasn’t 
enough. So that’s how I got sanctioned. 
(Graham)
Stuart had faced similar problems because 
his efforts were not recorded online:
…it’s not good enough [recording job-
search efforts] on paper for them, I’m not 
too good on the computer, I explained to 
them that, I’m not the best, I’ve tried to get 
some help with it but to them it’s not good 
enough, they literally sanction you, that’s 
what it’s like. (Stuart)
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Box 3.1 Detailed reasons for 
sanctions: case studies
William has borderline learning dificulties, mental 
ill health (schizophrenia, anxiety and paranoia), 
poor computer literacy, has a support worker and 
has recently served a three year prison sentence. 
On release he was advised to claim JSA and was 
instructed to apply for 15 jobs per week. William 
made every effort to meet his requirements - ‘I 
pushed everything out of the way just to meet the 
target, like going and seeing my kids and everything 
like that, just to get to the target’ - but he could not 
apply for enough jobs and was sanctioned. A couple 
of months later William made a successful claim 
for ESA and was placed in the Support Group (i.e. 
recognised as not capable of work-related activity). 
David was sanctioned for four weeks for failing 
to attend an appointment at the Jobcentre. David 
did not receive the letter informing him of his 
appointment. At the time, David was using a day 
centre as a postal address and was checking his 
post regularly. He received other letters but nothing 
from the Jobcentre until the letter arrived informing 
him that he had been sanctioned. Ja had a similar 
experience and was sanctioned twice for failing to 
attend appointments for which he had received no 
notiication. Unlike David, Ja was housed and living 
alone at the time so there is no particular reason why 
his post failed to reach him. 
Anisa was sanctioned for failing to sign on. She 
had been on JSA for some time but had moved to 
a different area and so had to make a fresh claim. 
At the very start of her new claim she was asked to 
attend a group meeting (on a Thursday) and was told 
that her signing on day was a Friday. She assumed 
her irst signing date would be the following week 
- her previous experience was that a irst signing 
date is usually a week or two after your claim starts 
- and did not check the appointment card they gave 
her.  In fact, she was due to sign the very next day. 
As soon as she realised her mistake she contacted 
Jobcentre Plus but was told she did not have a valid 
reason. Anisa had an otherwise perfect record of 
compliance.
Lewis secured a job interview while on the Work 
Programme and informed his Work Programme 
Provider that he would not be in on the day of his 
interview. When he received no beneit payment 
he enquired as to why and was told he had been 
sanctioned for failure to attend the Work Programme. 
When he spoke again to his Work Programme 
Provider he was told he should also have informed 
Jobcentre Plus. He had not been told this at the 
time. Lewis’ Work Programme Provider and his Work 
Coach agreed that he had a good reason but his 
Work Programme Provider insisted that despite this, 
he had no choice but to record Lewis as a ‘failure 
to attend’ and his Work Coach insisted that, having 
been recorded in this way, he had no choice but to 
sanction Lewis. Lewis asked for reconsideration and 
his sanction was then overturned.
Ross went to the wrong ofice for an appointment. 
It is not clear how this mistake occurred but he 
explained what happened next:
‘I’m trying to ring me advisor and tell them that I’ve 
been to the place they asked me to go and they’ve 
said that I haven’t got an appointment there and my 
appointment must be in Manchester city, so I went 
there [city centre] and when I got there it was too late 
and after that it was sanction upon sanction’.
Jonathan and Adam, whose experiences 
are detailed further in Chapter 4, were both 
very actively seeking work in the industries in 
which they had experience and were applying 
for the requisite number of jobs each week. 
But they had not done so according to the 
speciic requirements of their Claimant 
Commitment and were sanctioned. Adam 
was an experienced commis chef and knew 
that the best way to secure employment in 
that trade was to hand out CVs in person 
but his Work Coach insisted he applied for 
jobs online only. He was sanctioned for not 
seeking work in this way, despite keeping 
detailed records of his activity:
Yeah [I recorded] the date I’d looked for 
it, the site I’d used and if they got back 
to me and where I’d handed it [CV] out 
or whatever and they still weren’t happy 
with that, the whole thing was illed out 
and they didn’t agree with me not doing 
Universal Jobmatch. (Adam)
Jonathan was sanctioned for applying for ‘the 
wrong’ job; jobs that were not speciied on 
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his Claimant Commitment (as we will see in 
Chapter 4, Jonathan had not been allowed to 
specify jobs for which he was most qualiied 
on his Claimant Commitment): 
The reason they gave me was I weren’t 
being practical in what I were looking for… 
cos I were looking for racing jobs and I 
did put that in there [booklet recording 
job search] and he looked at it and said 
‘it’s not in your agreement to look for that, 
you have to look for warehouse, factory, 
telesales’ ... and he said ‘I’ve got to send it 
to a decision maker to see if you’re going 
to be sanctioned’ it took them less than an 
hour and they rang me on my mobile and 
said I was sanctioned. (Jonathan)
The case studies and examples presented 
in this chapter hint at a host of challenges 
and barriers encountered by homelessness 
service users meeting conditionality. Implicit 
in some of their stories are practical barriers 
associated with the requirement for internet-
based job searches, for example, or the lack 
of a secure postal address, and it is clear 
that homelessness service users’ personal 
circumstances and support needs can 
render the level of conditionality placed upon 
them, or the speciics of these requirements, 
inappropriate. We look at these barriers and 
challenges in more detail in Chapter 4 where 
we broaden out the focus of discussion to 
claimants’ wider experiences of setting and 
meeting conditionality requirements and of 
the help and support offered through the 
current beneits system. 
3.4 Key points
• Results from the survey corroborate the 
scant, but emerging evidence base on 
sanctions and homelessness, suggesting 
that homelessness service users are 
disproportionately affected by sanctions. 
In fact, those claiming JSA may be twice 
as likely to be sanctioned as the JSA 
claimant population as a whole. In total, 39 
per cent of the survey sample had been 
sanctioned in the past year.
• Survey results indicate that it is vulnerable 
claimants who are most likely to be 
sanctioned. For example 45 per cent 
of respondents with mental ill health 
had been sanctioned in the past year 
compared with 34 per cent of those 
without. 
• Respondents were very rarely sanctioned 
for wilfully refusing to comply with 
conditionality requirements, a fact 
relected in the high proportion (82 per 
cent) reporting having a good reason for 
failing to meet the condition for which 
they were sanctioned. Rather, they made 
honest mistakes, they had not received 
notiication of appointments, were ill, or 
were set conditions that were clearly not 
appropriate to their capabilities.
• These results have signiicant implications 
for policy, indicating as they do that 
sanctions are not being used just as a 
deterrent threat, or being imposed only on 
those ‘refusing to play by the rules’.
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In the previous chapter we saw that 
a very high proportion (39 per cent) of 
homelessness service users had been 
sanctioned. We have also seen that there is 
strong support for a system of conditionality 
amongst this population group and that 
the majority are keen to work and develop 
skills to bring them closer to the labour 
market (Chapter 2). These two facts are 
somewhat incongruent. Why would so 
many homelessness claimants not comply 
with conditionality requirements, if they are 
motivated to improve their standing in the 
labour market and support the obligation 
to do so in return for receipt of beneits? 
In this chapter we explore respondents’ 
experiences of attempting to meet 
conditionality requirements. In doing so, an 
answer to this question begins to emerge: 
that homelessness service users’ efforts are 
severely hampered by systemic and personal 
barriers to compliance.
4.1 Setting conditionality 
requirements
In the main, the 42 in-depth interview 
respondents had found the process of 
applying for JSA or ESA straightforward, 
with few problems highlighted. The process 
of drawing up and agreeing the Claimant 
Commitment was also reported to be 
straightforward. 
The Claimant Commitment is a personalised 
document setting out claimants’ 
responsibilities in relation to their receipt 
of JSA, ESA or Universal Credit (UC) and is 
drawn up in a meeting between the claimant 
and their Work Coach. DWP guidance 
explains that it ‘is generated as a result of a 
conversation with the claimant.’23
Although the process of agreeing Claimant 
Commitments was straightforward, few 
respondents recognised it as the product of 
a conversation. They did describe discussion 
between themselves and their advisors - for 
example several reported being asked what 
type of work they hoped to secure - but most 
thought the purpose of the meeting was to 
be ‘told’ their conditions. Andy and David 
make this clear: 
‘[the advisor] just went ‘you’ve got to apply 
for 32 jobs and you’ve got to look for 35 
hours a week’, that’s what they said to me, 
that was it, I signed this piece of paper 
‘come back next Tuesday at 20 to 10’ that 
was it [Interviewer: So how did it come 
about that you were told that you had to 
apply for 32 jobs?] Cos the advisor told me 
this is what you’ve got to do. (Andy)
I’ve got to look [apply] for nine jobs a 
week and I’ve got to spend 20 hours on 
the computer every week looking for jobs 
and in newspapers and stuff…I’ve got no 
choice basically, that’s what they’ve give me. 
[So you couldn’t discuss that with them?] 
No that’s what the agreement was on the 
job seekers anyway…I didn’t think I had a 
choice really. (David)
Those who were unhappy with the terms 
of their Claimant Commitment rarely tried 
to negotiate, believing they had no choice. 
William, for example, considered his 
commitment to apply for 15 jobs per week 
unreasonable in light of his circumstances 
but felt unable to express his concerns, 
explaining that ‘I just wanted to do what 
they said so I didn’t get sanctioned’. Gerry, 
meanwhile, assumed that the Claimant 
Commitment was a standard agreement that 
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24  All interview respondents had been sanctioned at some point in the past year, making it more likely that they would raise concerns about their 
conditions. 
25  DWP (2014) Government’s response to the Independent review of the operation of Jobseeker’s Allowance sanctions validated by the Jobseek-
ers Act 2013, London: Department for Work and Pensions,p6.
26 See Chapter K2 of the Decision Makers guide https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ile/439812/admk2.pdf
all claimants were required to sign: 
…it were like a set agreement that 
everyone had, there were no ifs or buts, 
that’s what you had to do. (Gerry)
Some interview respondents felt the 
requirements set out in their Claimant 
Commitment were reasonable and appropriate 
to their capabilities. Many, however, did not.24 
In detailed discussions with respondents, 
three particular issues emerged: 
Firstly, some advisors used what appeared 
to be the ‘one size its all’ approach to 
setting job search requirements, without 
fully taking account of individuals’ skills and 
qualiications, experience of their trade, or 
preferences. This point is illustrated by two 
case studies presented in Box 4.1. In the 
irst, Jonathan’s experience as a qualiied 
racing horse handler exempliies the lack of 
consideration given to claimants’ skills; in 
the second we see no lexibility in the Work 
Coach’s requirement to seek jobs online.
Secondly, there was evidence of Work 
Coaches failing to acknowledge and 
account for the limitations on respondents’ 
job search capability, particularly in relation 
to the number of jobs respondents were 
required to apply for and the number of hours 
they were expected to spend job searching. 
We discuss this issue in more detail when 
we come to look at the speciic barriers 
homelessness service users face meeting 
conditionality requirements. For now we can 
note that it was common for respondents to 
be required to apply for 15-20 jobs per week, 
often online, including people who were 
rough sleeping, with no internet access, no 
qualiications and with additional support 
needs likely to make job searching more 
dificult (e.g. low levels of literacy or computer 
literacy; and mental health issues). 
DWP policy and guidance is very clear that 
‘any work-related requirements placed on 
claimants should be personalised according 
to their needs and circumstances, taking 
into account any restrictions.’ And that 
they should be ‘reasonable…relecting 
the claimant’s particular capability and 
circumstances’.25 Potential limitations 
faced by people as a result of their housing 
circumstances should be taken into account 
when drafting the Claimant Commitment.26 
In practice, however, it was common for 
interview respondents to report job search 
requirements they felt were unreasonable or 
impossible to meet given their circumstances 
and Work Coaches who seemed uninterested 
in gathering information about their 
capabilities. This was Jonathan’s experience. 
When asked whether his Work Coach had 
enquired about his circumstances, he replied: 
No, not interested in any of it, all they want 
to know is whether you’ve been looking for 
jobs, that were all he were ever interested 
in. At the time we were experiencing 
problems with the accommodation we 
were in, I tried explaining that, he weren’t 
interested. (Jonathan)
Thus, although most respondents supported 
the principle of conditionality (see Chapter 
2.5), their support was not unconditional. 
They supported a system that set reasonable 
and fair requirements according to 
circumstances and capability. Respondents 
were not convinced the current regime met 
this requirement: 
Well it is reasonable. I get where they’re 
[Government] coming from. They don’t 
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want people sitting on their arse and that…
It’s reasonable but not 35 hours a week, 
that’s not reasonable. I can’t look for 35 
hours a week. (Andy)
They have a right to ask me to do 
something in order to get my money, I 
understand this and it’s not that I’m 
ighting against this, so if you want money 
in this country, give something back. The 
trouble is, how much is enough? (Helena)
Thirdly, practices appeared very variable, 
an issue we pick up further later in this 
chapter. One would expect each Claimant 
Commitment to be different - they are 
personal tailored documents after all - but 
the number of job search hours or job 
applications required and the method of job 
search allowed varied with little apparent 
logic. For example lower expectations were 
placed on some respondents with relatively 
stable housing and few additional support 
needs than on others who were sleeping 
rough with signiicant additional issues. We 
have already seen that some respondents 
(Adam, for example) were required to do 
all job seeking activity online despite poor 
computer proiciency or literacy, yet others 
reported that their Claimant Commitment 
allowed for a wide variety of activity. When 
asked about the terms of his Claimant 
Commitment, Gerry for example explained 
that:
You [I] have to regularly use internet, regularly 
check the papers, regularly ask family and 
friends, hand out CVs where possible where 
you think you might get a job and things like 
that. (Gerry)
We saw in Chapter 2 that most respondents 
were keen to work within their capabilities, to 
develop skills to improve their employability 
now or in the future, and were generally 
supportive of a regime of conditionality. In 
addition, the case studies presented in 
Chapter 3 show that many homelessness 
service users made concerted efforts to 
meet the conditions set out in their Claimant 
Commitment. As Helena was at pains to 
emphasise when she said ‘I have health and 
safety level 1, I have catering 1, what I want 
to show is I’m not lazy, I’m really trying to work.’
Yet we also know that a signiicant proportion 
did not meet the terms of their Claimant 
Commitment and were sanctioned. Exploring 
in more detail respondents efforts to meet 
conditionality requirements provides an 
explanation: respondents encountered a host 
of problems and barriers to complying with 
their Claimant Commitment, despite often 
being willing, and trying to do so. 
The majority (63 per cent) of the 548 
survey respondents who were subject 
to conditionality reported inding the 
requirements placed upon them dificult 
to meet, rising to 79 per cent of the 213 
respondents sanctioned in the past year 
(compared with 54 per cent of those not 
sanctioned). This suggests that problems 
and barriers to meeting conditionality 
requirements may explain high sanction rates, 
more so than unwillingness to do so. For 
example, Table 4.1. shows that those inding 
it dificult to meet requirements were:
• More likely to have been in local authority 
care or fostered 
• More likely to have physical or mental 
health problems
• More likely to have experienced violence 
or abuse from a parent or partner
• More likely to have had drug or alcohol 
dependency issues
• Slightly less likely to have educational or 
vocational qualiications 
• More detached from the labour market (i.e. 
more likely to have never had a job or last 
worked regularly more than ive years ago).
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Box 4.1. A ‘one size its all’ 
approach to setting conditionality 
requirements?
Jonathan is an experienced, trained racehorse 
handler living in Yorkshire, which boasts more 
racecourses than any other region. Yet he was 
denied the opportunity to specify this job on his 
Claimant Commitment. Jonathan also felt that his 
advisor was mocking him, undermining the skills he 
had worked hard to attain. He explained:  
Yeah I went for an initial discussion with them, what 
I want to do, and when I mentioned previously what 
I’d done with horse racing they just laughed at me, 
in their own words they said that ‘wasn’t realistic’ I 
need to wake up and smell coffee, with horse racing 
you earn a lot more than somebody who works in 
a factory.  I see a factory as a dead end job, it’s a 
last resort. They asked me ‘why did I waste all my 
time going to college and doing what I did?’ And I 
complained about the advisor cos he actually said to 
me he thought horseracing was for girls. 
Jonathan was told that if he applied for jobs in this 
ield he would have to ‘do it privately in my own time’ 
and they would not ‘count’ towards his targets.
Adam had a similar experience, this time in relation 
to his method of job search. As a qualiied and 
experienced commis chef, he is familiar with the 
industry and knows that the best way to secure 
employment is by handing out CVs in person. He has 
found work many times this way. Adam explained 
that ‘a head chef is not going to look through 
500 emails, but if you just go in and speak to him 
and he can see you face-to-face, he’s got more 
understanding of what you’re like.’ Adam is also not 
very IT proicient. But his advisor insisted that all his 
job search activity was done online through Universal 
Jobmatch and this was recorded on his Claimant 
Commitment. 
I’m a chef, been a chef the last ive years and I’m not 
into internet, computer stuff, Universal Jobmatch, 
so I was going to the library or using their printers 
and printing out CVs and I was just going into 
restaurants, cafes, hotels and physically giving my 
CV and if anything came of it phone me, but they 
weren’t happy with that, they wanted me to do the 
job search on Universal [Jobmatch] and look for I 
think it was an hour and a half a day, I had to look for 
at least 30 jobs, look for and apply for. 
Adam continued seeking work by distributing CVs 
and was sanctioned, prompting him to stop claiming 
JSA so he could continue searching for work in the 
way he felt would be most effective. He has secured 
a number of temporary jobs since then (by handing 
out CVs) but in-between relies on charities, friends 
and family, mostly ‘sofa suring’ and sometimes 
sleeping rough. He continues to actively seek work.
Of course not all those reporting dificulties 
were sanctioned, and others reporting no 
dificulties nevertheless failed to meet their 
conditions. This latter group are likely to 
include those who were happy with the 
terms of their Claimant Commitment but 
who received no notiication of a particular 
appointment, or made an honest mistake 
about the time or date (see Chapter 3 for a 
classiication of ‘reasons for sanction’). 
Nevertheless, it is clear from the survey 
results and from the detailed information 
provided by interview respondents that many 
homelessness service users face signiicant 
barriers to complying with conditionality. It is 
to these that we now turn.
4.2 Barriers to meeting 
conditionality requirements
Survey respondents reporting dificulties 
meeting conditions were asked to specify 
what had most hindered their efforts to 
comply. Some barriers to compliance 
were systemic (i.e. related to the operation 
of the beneit system) and others were 
personal (i.e. related to characteristics 
and circumstances of the individual) 
although this is not an absolute distinction: 
poor IT proiciency, for example, is 
only problematic if the beneit system 
demands online engagement, while the 
lack of a secure postal address is only 
problematic if letters are the principal form 
of communication.
The results show that the most common 
systemic problems were: 
• Being asked to apply for too many jobs 
 4. Homelessness service users’ experiences of conditionality 19
each week (72 per cent of JSA claimants; 
not applicable to ESA claimants) 
• Having important appointments that 
clashed with Jobcentre/Work Programme 
appointments (72 per cent)
• Dificulties getting the necessary help from 
Jobcentre Plus (71 per cent)
• Needing, and not having, regular access to 
the internet (67 per cent) 
• Being given the wrong information (64 per 
cent cited)
• Letters not reaching the respondent/post 
going missing (64 per cent).
And the most common personal barriers 
faced were:
• Not having enough money to travel to 
appointments (77 per cent)
• Not having suitable/clean clothes for 
appointments/interviews (57 per cent)
• Having mental health issues (51 per cent).
There were stark differences between JSA 
and ESA WRAG claimants with regard 
to the personal barriers they faced. This 
stands in contrast to systemic dificulties 
which were encountered similarly by both 
claimant groups. Of all ESA WRAG claimants 
reporting problems meeting conditionality 
requirements: 
• 77 per cent cited mental health issues (34 
per cent of JSA claimants)
• 68 per cent had dificulty remembering to 
turn up for appointments (36 per cent of 
JSA claimants)
• 56 per cent cited issues with alcohol or 
drugs (34 per cent of JSA claimants)
• 52 per cent said they were too worried/
busy trying to ind somewhere to stay 
each day (38 per cent of JSA claimants).
We would expect higher levels of vulnerability 
amongst ESA claimants but conditionality 
requirements should be adjusted to account 
for this. In effect, the requirements placed on 
ESA WRAG claimants should be lowered to 
create a level playing ield with JSA claimants. 
As a result, problems complying with 
requirements due to issues such as mental 
ill health should not be signiicantly higher 
amongst ESA WRAG claimants.
If we consider the reasons why respondents 
were sanctioned (see Chapter 3), and their 
experiences of agreeing their Claimant 
Commitment (see above), many of the 
problems cited by survey respondents come 
as no surprise. We have already seen, for 
example, that some respondents found job 
search targets were set unreasonably high, 
and that the mismatch between respondents’ 
capabilities and their conditionality 
requirements explains a proportion of 
interview respondents’ sanctions. Missing 
post, unclear or inaccurate communication, 
clashing commitments, and the requirement 
to job-seek online all emerged as issues in 
the discussion in Chapter 3. In the remainder 
of this section we draw on the in-depth 
interview data to illuminate further some of 
the common barriers to compliance indicated 
by the survey results and those which 
emerged as signiicant in interviews with 
sanctioned claimants. 
Internet access and the requirement to 
conduct job search activity online
The requirement for claimants to do much 
of their job searching online combined with 
homeless peoples’ limited access to the 
internet emerged as a signiicant issue.  
This was a barrier to compliance in virtually all 
interviews. All respondents expected to seek 
jobs were required to do so online, 
and speciically through Universal Jobmatch. 
Yet no interview respondent had easy, 
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ready access to the internet, including  
those who were housed. Only one 
respondent had his own computer,  
but even he could rarely afford to top up  
his ‘Pay as you Go’ internet and many did not 
have functioning smartphones. 
Most relied on their local library but this 
offered limited access of an hour or so per 
day. Some used computers in their hostel or 
a local day centre but, again, reported that 
usage is time-limited and competition ierce. 
Respondents reported queuing for access to 
computers. Only a small minority mentioned 
using Jobcentre Plus computers to undertake 
job search. 
Internet and computer proiciency was also a 
signiicant issue, compounding problems of 
access. Quite a few respondents could only 
do online job search/applications with help, 
and help was rarely available for the requisite 
number of hours per week that respondents 
were expected to job search online. 
I’ve never used a computer in my life, 
they’re talking to me about online this and 
that, it’s just another language to me. (Pete) 
I can’t go on computers 35 hours a week, 
you’ve only got an hour a day in the library 
and an hour in here [day centre]…and 
once I’ve been in the library in town I can’t 
go in another library, I’ve tried, it doesn’t 
work, once you’ve been in a library once 
for an hour you can’t go back in it…they 
[Work Coach] see it as ‘go to the library’ 
but I can only get an hour in the library, or 
‘go to friends and family’…I’ve got friends 
but I’m not going to go round and go ‘I’m 
just going to use the internet’. (Andy)
Where I am [staying] now I’ve got no 
computer, I have to go to the library in the 
city centre, sometimes that’s hard to get 
on the computer and here at [day centre] 
it’s only once a week for three hours. (Rick) 
I have to do [Universal] Job match every 
day of the week. I’ve got to apply for 15 
jobs a week, it’s impossible, I can’t even 
work a computer…I’ve got a computer at 
my mum and dad’s maybe once or twice a 
week and I feel comfortable doing it there 
coz I get help with what I’m doing but that 
wasn’t good enough for them. (Stuart) 
Personal circumstances, vulnerabilities 
and support needs
Survey respondents were asked a range of 
questions about their health and personal 
experiences. Their responses indicate 
signiicant support needs amongst those 
subject to conditionality. Table 4.2 shows 
Table 4.1. Relationship between vulnerability and dificulty complying with conditionality
 Yes No
Been in local authority care/fostered 26 18
Have physical health problems and/or a disability 42 32
Have mental health problems 53 31
Health limits the amount or type of work I can do 63 44
Experienced violence/abuse from a parent 28 16
Experienced violence/abuse from a partner 28 21
Have alcohol/drug dependency issues 61 39
Have educational/vocational qualiications 60 69
Last regular job 5 or more years ago, or never had a regular job 49 35
Base 295 173
Found it dificult to 
meet conditions?
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that around one quarter had been in care and 
similar proportions had experienced abuse 
from partners and parents, and had literacy 
problems. More than half reported drug and 
alcohol problems and, as already discussed 
in section 2.2, physical and mental health 
problems were prevalent. In general, all of 
these factors were a more signiicant issue 
amongst ESA WRAG claimants than JSA 
claimants.
Combined with high ESA claimant rates, 
levels of labour market detachment and 
work-limiting health problems (see Chapter 
2), signiicant levels of multiple exclusion 
are indicated - amongst the full sample 
of homelessness service users but also 
speciically amongst those subject to 
conditionality. 
Looking at these data from another angle 
shows that a large proportion of respondents 
with signiicant barriers to work, such as 
literacy dificulties and health problems, 
were subject to the stringent, high level 
of conditionality imposed for JSA, which 
includes the need to demonstrate signiicant 
levels of job search activity and job 
applications. For example: 
• 54 per cent of those with dificulties with 
reading and writing were claiming JSA
• 49 per cent of those with a drug or alcohol 
dependency were claiming JSA
• 48 per cent of those who had been in local 
authority care were claiming JSA
• 39 per cent of those with a mental health 
issues were claiming JSA
• 37 per cent of those with physical health 
issues were claiming JSA.
In addition, amongst those sleeping rough 
at the time of the survey (representing 16 per 
cent of all those subject to conditionality) 70 
per cent were claiming JSA and therefore 
subject to high levels of conditionality. 
Although these characteristics and life 
experiences do not render individuals 
incapable of work-related activity nor certain 
to struggle in their efforts to seek work, they 
do indicate a level of multiple disadvantage 
and support needs over and above that of 
other beneit claimants; support needs that 
may make it much more dificult to navigate 
the conditionality system and meet the 
obligations set down for them. 
Drug and alcohol issues, and medication 
for mental and physical health problems, 
for example, affected some respondents’ 
capacity to remember the dates and times 
of appointments. Stan, who was sanctioned 
for failing to attend an appointment, was 
sleeping rough at the time and drinking 
heavily and explained that he ‘got my dates 
mixed up’. And Ross explained that ‘I 
have trouble with me memory coz of me 
meds’. Respondents with poor literacy and 
numeracy, dyslexia and borderline learning 
dificulties, meanwhile, reported dificulties 
navigating the beneits system. Making fresh 
claims, appeals, and understanding and 
meeting job search requirements required a 
level of literacy and comprehension that was 
sometimes beyond them. 
I got the dates mixed up…I were drinking 
quite a lot as well at the time, I’ve only 
recently got off it really. (Stan)
They were asking me to get on computers 
but I have trouble reading and writing and 
things like that so I didn’t bother going 
back. (Pete) 
I can’t read and write properly and I got 
no help whatsoever so I had to struggle 
to do the form, I just about did it, asking 
somebody beside me to help me read and 
stuff like that. (Jonathan)
It took me three attempts to get down 
to appointment, that’s why it [sanction] 
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lasted for so long, about a year and a 
half, cos usually you’re meant to have that 
appointment after six months and it went 
on for ages, I kept missing them cos I was 
getting worked up, panicky, anxiety mainly. 
(Kyle) 
Yeah I was claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance 
before my illness but when I got ill I didn’t 
think it would be hard… I said ‘look this is 
what [medication] I’m on, I won’t be able 
to make certain appointments cos I ain’t 
going to be able to get out of my bed to 
attend these appointments’. Basically I 
was sanctioned for a month at irst and 
then sanctioned for three months and then 
sanctioned for six months. (Lee)
Clashing appointments, dealing with other 
issues
The majority of survey and in-depth interview 
respondents were homeless, a signiicant 
proportion were sleeping rough, and many 
were dealing with other issues in their life 
such as poor mental and physical health, 
drug and alcohol dependency, destructive 
personal relationships, escaping and 
recovering from violent relationships, and 
family issues such as estrangement from 
children and parents. As we saw above, 
many of these were claiming JSA and so 
subject to full conditionality. 
Yeah cos at the time I had quite a lot of 
health appointments I needed to get to 
and I had to it them around the jobcentre  
and it’s impossible to do but they don’t 
understand that. (Jonathan)
I come here [voluntary sector service] and I 
get someone to help me to look [for jobs], I 
think I’ve got an email but I don’t know cos 
I don’t keep things, my things are all over 
the place, my head’s all over the place, I’ve 
got children in jail, my son’s doing life, one 
doing nine years, kids’ mothers who want 
to change the kids’ names… I’m trying to 
hold it together. (Fred)
I wasn’t looking for work, I wasn’t in a 
state to work, I was trying to get into detox. 
(Brian)
Managing the psychological, practical and 
emotional effects and implications of these 
personal issues and circumstances was 
described by respondents as a ‘full time job’. 
Seeking and applying for housing, attending 
meetings with key workers in hostels, with 
drug and alcohol support workers and 
treatment programmes, and keeping hospital 
and doctors’ appointments was time 
consuming but essential for many. 
Yet meeting conditionality requirements 
(for those on JSA) was also a full time job. 
It is little surprise, then, that respondents 
struggled to ind the time to seek work for 35 
hours a week or apply for 15 jobs, to keep 
their schedule clear for appointments, and to 
Table 4.2. Personal experiences and vulnerabilities by claimant group 
 JSA % ESA WRAG % All subject to conditionality %
Has a drug or alcohol dependency 41 70 52
Has mental health issues 28 72 45
Has a physical health problem or disability 24 66 40
Has experienced violence or abuse from a partner 20 37 26
Has dificulty reading or writing 22 30 25
Has been in LA care 19 33 24
Has experienced violence or abuse from a parent 19 32 24
Base 338 213 548
Note: these categories are not mutually exclusive
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remain focused enough to apply themselves 
fully to the tasks they were set. The majority 
of survey respondents reporting dificulties 
meeting requirements (72 per cent) stated that 
clashing appointments was a problem for them.
The problem was compounded by the 
requirement imposed on some to seek work 
seven days a week, leaving respondents 
no spare time in which to schedule health, 
housing, and other personal appointments, 
resolve family problems, see their children, or 
take time out to relieve mental health issues. 
This was not mentioned explicitly by many of 
the in-depth respondents but was reported 
by three, one of whom said he was asked to 
demonstrate the jobs he had sought on New 
Year’s Day. 
Insecure postal addresses, written 
communication, missing post
We saw in Chapter 3 that a common reason 
for respondents to be sanctioned was failing 
to attend appointments of which they never 
received notiication. It is not possible to 
verify that these letters were sent to the 
correct address but, assuming they were, 
they did not ind their way to the respondent. 
Of those survey respondents who 
reported dificulties meeting conditionality 
requirements 64 per cent said letters do not 
always reach them or their post goes missing 
and 37 per cent said they had nowhere safe 
to keep their post.
This is not surprising. Respondents moved 
frequently, as homeless people often 
have to, those in hostel or night shelter 
accommodation sometimes lived in large 
buildings sharing with many other residents, 
and they used friends, family, and day 
centres as correspondence addresses. Their 
post was, therefore, often mediated through 
others, held insecurely, or not accessible 
on a daily basis. A couple of respondents 
described instances where they had informed 
Jobcentre Plus of a change of address, just 
after a letter had been sent to their previous 
address. Both pointed out that they had been 
at Jobcentre Plus in person around the same 
time and failed to understand why no one 
told them verbally about their appointment. 
Priya was one of these respondents. She 
had become homeless escaping domestic 
violence and led to another city. Knowing 
no one, she provided Jobcentre Plus with 
a relative’s address in a different city for 
correspondence. She quickly moved into 
temporary accommodation and informed 
Jobcentre Plus of this in person but in the 
meantime they had sent a letter to her 
correspondence address asking her to 
attend an appointment. She did not pick 
up the letter, having assumed that any 
correspondence would reach her at her new 
address, and was sanctioned. 
I live in a block of lats so it doesn’t mean 
I’m going to get that letter. You can send 
the letter out so you’ve got proof of it but 
there’s no proof that I’ve got it. So if I 
don’t get the letter they’re automatically 
sanctioning me. (Douglas)
I didn’t get letter cos they sent it to old 
address, I even changed it that week on 
the Monday, they didn’t say ‘you’ve got 
another appointment’ they just left me 
guessing, they had my new address so 
they could have easily text me or they 
had my phone number and all my details. 
(Maggie)
DWP communication, unclear processes, 
complexities of the system
Many of the survey respondents who were 
having problems meeting conditionality 
requirements gave a range of issues to do 
with poor communication as a main reason for 
inding conditionality dificult to comply with:
• 64 per cent had sometimes been given the 
wrong information
• 48 per cent had had appointments 
cancelled at short notice
• 48 per cent found the letters received were 
dificult to understand
• 47 per cent said it was not always clear 
what they were meant to do.
There were also numerous examples in 
the in-depth interviews of apparently 
poor communication from DWP, possible 
misinformation (although not corroborated), 
systems that respondents found impossible 
to navigate, and rules and processes that 
sometimes appeared perverse. Helena 
expressed this in the following terms:
Yeah it [JSA] had been stopped…now they 
say from June I get nothing cos I have too 
big an income or something like that and 
I don’t understand how they get to the 
point that I have enough income, I have no 
idea what’s happening. It’s too much for 
me to deal with it...It’s scary actually, the 
conditions are not explained when you 
sign on irst, you don’t know how you will 
be affected, you don’t have the number 
of the advisor, sometimes you’re not even 
given a telephone number or an email and 
you don’t know how to just inform people, 
or you call and they’re not there and you 
don’t know who else to call. (Helena who 
has no income other than JSA)
It was clear in interviews that respondents 
were not always sure why or how their beneit 
claim had progressed in the way it had, and 
it was not always easy to piece together in 
interviews the history of their claim or the 
circumstances leading to their sanction. 
Errors also appear to have been made at 
times by DWP, including lost documentation 
and erroneously-applied sanctions, as 
Dennis’ experiences demonstrate: 
Whilew I was on JSA I had to attend a 
two year back to work programme, I was 
attending, I kept all the appointments…I 
was doing job searches and everything 
and one day I got a letter saying ‘you’ve 
been sanctioned cos you’re not doing 
enough looking for work’ so I seen my 
advisor and she got in touch with the 
jobcentre and said ‘what’s going on?’. 
They said ‘somebody in Wimbledon is 
not happy with his job search’ which 
I thought was a bit funny cos being in 
Leamington Spa what would it have to do 
with Wimbledon? But apparently that’s 
where all the paperwork goes to. So I 
24 Homeless people’s experiences of welfare conditionality and beneit sanctions
Box 4.2. Case Studies
Lewis was too ill to attend an appointment at 
Jobcentre Plus so he phoned to inform them and 
his Work Coach asked him to attend the following 
day instead. Lewis thought it unlikely that he would 
recover that quickly but his Work Coach had no other 
dates available so insisted he attend. As expected, 
Lewis was too ill to attend. Once well again, a 
few days later (and the day he was interviewed), 
he called his Work Coach to arrange a time the 
following day (also his signing on day and the day 
before the Easter weekend) to deliver his sick note 
but neither his Work Coach nor any other advisor 
had an available appointment. Lewis was also told, 
however, that he could not sign on the following day 
as usual because he had been recorded as a ‘failure 
to attend’ and so was not allowed to sign on until he 
had been seen about this. Yet no-one was available 
to see him until after the Easter weekend. Lewis was 
extremely concerned that he would be sanctioned 
for failing to attend his appointment and/or failing 
to sign on. He certainly knew he would receive no 
beneit until he was allowed to sign on.  
Benjamin is in the process of applying to have his 
discretionary leave to remain (initially granted for 
three years) renewed. While his application is being 
considered, which is taking some months, the Home 
Ofice has the documentation employers require 
before they can issue a contract of employment. 
Were Benjamin to secure a job, his new employer 
would not be able to proceed with his appointment. 
Benjamin was, in fact, recently offered a job but the 
offer was withdrawn when he could not produce 
his papers. Jobcentre Plus are fully aware of 
the situation but nevertheless require him to do 
extensive job search activity. We saw earlier in this 
chapter that Benjamin was sanctioned for failing to 
prove he had done suficient job searching for work 
he would not be able to take up, were he offered it. 
made an appointment to see somebody 
at the jobcentre and they said ‘you’ve 
been sanctioned for six weeks cos you’re 
not doing a signiicant job search’. I took 
with me my folder and I said ‘which month 
does this apply to?’ that was July, and I 
took out every job I’d applied for in July 
and there was 350 and they took a copy 
of it and said ‘you’ll hear the decision’. A 
decision was made four weeks later that 
I was doing more than enough and my 
claim was reinstated. Next time I went 
to sign on…yet again I was sanctioned 
for three weeks from the same person 
in Wimbledon, not doing enough job 
searching. (Dennis)
At least two respondents failed to meet their 
requirements (attending an appointment 
or course) because location details were 
erroneously provided or not at all. In a small 
number of examples the system appeared 
completely illogical - these are presented as 
case studies in Box 4.2. 
4.4 Key points
• DWP policy and guidance makes clear 
that ‘any work-related requirements 
placed on claimants should be 
personalised according to their needs and 
circumstances, taking into account any 
restrictions.’ Yet the requirements detailed 
in respondents’ Claimant Commitment 
documents were frequently seemingly 
impossible to meet, inconsiderate of 
their constrained circumstances, and 
sometimes failed to take account 
of respondents’ particular skills and 
employment experience. 
• Respondents described Work 
Coaches who seemed uninterested in 
gathering relevant information about 
their circumstances and capabilities. 
Thus rough sleepers with additional 
vulnerabilities (mental health issues, 
dependencies) and no ready access to the 
internet were being required to apply for 
10-15 jobs per week and spend several 
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hours every day searching for jobs online. 
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that 
the majority of respondents (63 per cent) 
found the conditionality requirements 
placed upon them dificult to meet. 
• The conditionality imposed on 
respondents raised questions about 
consistency of practice in relation to 
vulnerable people. Some respondents 
with poor IT proiciency and no access 
to the internet were required to conduct 
most or all of their job-seeking online (and 
were sanctioned for failing to do so) while 
others with higher levels of proiciency 
were allowed to use other methods, such 
as looking in newspapers, asking friends 
and family and handing out CVs.
• The evidence suggests that it is 
systemic and personal barriers to 
meeting conditionality requirements that 
explains the high sanction rate amongst 
homelessness service users rather than 
unwillingness to comply.
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The research was interested in shedding light 
on ‘what works’ for homelessness service 
users in relation to helping them achieve 
their aspiration to work or, in the case of 
those unable to work, to enhance skills and 
conidence to move them closer to the labour 
market, and address those issues hindering 
their capacity to work. 
There is considerable in-system support 
for JSA and ESA WRAG claimants. All 
are assigned a Work Coach with whom 
they meet regularly and whose role it is 
to support claimants, and help them ind 
work or take steps to move closer to work. 
Universal Jobmatch - a website set up 
by the Government where job vacancies 
are advertised - provides a resource for 
jobseekers and employers, helping match 
jobs to the most suitable jobseekers. People 
claiming JSA for longer than three months 
and those in the ESA WRAG can also take 
advantage of the services and schemes 
available through the Work Programme - a 
‘welfare-to-work’ programme launched in 
2011 and delivered by a range of private, 
public and voluntary sector organisations 
under contract to the Government. The 
Work Programme offers support to ind work, 
courses, training and work experience. 
The current ive year contracts for this 
programme of employment support are 
coming to an end and the Work Programme 
will be re-commissioned in England and 
Wales, with new contracts beginning in 
2017. Employment Support in Scotland will 
be devolved at that time. It is not yet clear 
what a devolved programme of employment 
support, and the use of conditionality 
within this, will look like but consultation is 
underway, overseen by an advisory group 
chaired by Professor Alan McGregor. 
Homelessness service users participating 
in this research were asked in some detail 
about their experiences of this in-system 
support. Respondents also talked about the 
support and assistance they received beyond 
that provided through the beneit system. 
Homelessness service users come into 
contact with a wide range of professionals, 
some of whom play a role in supporting 
people to move closer to the labour market. 
Day centres and other voluntary sector 
homelessness services often run courses 
and training, for example, and some offer 
opportunities for volunteering. Key workers 
in hostels and support workers may also help 
their clients with work-related activities as 
part of their wider remit to support clients into 
a more secure, stable life and promote their 
well-being. 
In this chapter we draw on survey and in-
depth interview respondents’ experiences 
of all forms of support to draw conclusions 
about those that appeared to make a positive 
difference to their experiences and outcomes. 
5.1 In-system support 
The level of interaction with Jobcentre 
Plus staff varies widely depending on the 
level of conditionality expected for the 
beneit group. So, asking a standard set 
of questions about the in-system support 
respondents received is complex. Three out 
of ive survey respondents who said they 
had some level of dificulty, even if only a 
small amount, in meeting their conditionality 
requirements were subject to the higher 
level of conditionality imposed via JSA. Of 
these, 66 per cent agreed that their advisor/
Work Coach was helpful/sometimes helpful 
and 55 per cent agreed that sometimes 
the job search target they had been 
set was achievable. Of this same group 
(JSA claimants inding it dificult to meet 
conditionality requirements) 41 per cent said 
Jobcentre Plus had helped/sometimes helped 
them look for work, 39 per cent found the 
Work Programme helpful/sometimes helpful 
and 33 per cent agreed the courses they had 
been sent on had been useful/sometimes 
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useful, but only nine per cent said the help 
they had received had helped/sometimes 
helped them ind work. 
ESA WRAG claimants have less interaction 
with Jobcentre Plus as they are not required 
to sign on or attend as many work-focused 
interviews. They are also subject to a 
lower level of conditionality as they are not 
expected to look for work. Of the ESA WRAG 
claimants that found conditionality dificult 
62 per cent agreed that their advisor/Work 
Coach was helpful/sometimes helpful, 40 
per cent said Jobcentre Plus had helped/
sometimes helped them look for work, only 
20 per cent found the Work Programme 
helpful/sometimes helpful and 18 per cent 
agreed the courses they had been sent on 
had been useful/sometimes useful, but only 
eight per said the help they had received 
had helped/sometimes helped them ind 
work. Claimants in the ESA WRAG are not 
expected to ind work so it is interesting 
that, amongst our survey respondents, JSA 
claimants were only slightly more likely than 
ESA WRAG claimants to report that the help 
they received helped them to ind work (nine 
per cent, see above).
Respondents’ experiences of the help 
and support provided through the beneit 
system were so variable it is dificult to 
draw any conclusions about the merits and 
effectiveness of the different components of 
in-system support. Some had high praise for 
a course they were referred to, while others 
said theirs gave them no new skills. Some 
described helpful and understanding Work 
Coaches, and being supported to build CVs 
and improve interview skills, while others 
reported being treated with disdain and 
offered nothing they recognised as help and 
assistance to ind work. The quotes in Box 
5.1. show the wide variation in experiences. 
Respondents who had been assigned more 
than one Work Coach during their time 
claiming beneits often stressed the point that 
the value and effectiveness of support was 
highly variable, explicitly noting the difference 
between one ofice or advisor and another 
in relation to issues such as the level of 
conditionality imposed, consideration given 
to respondents’ circumstances, the help 
provided seeking work, discretion employed 
when targets were not quite achieved and 
the value of courses, training and work 
experience they were referred to. This raises 
questions about consistency of service and 
implementation of regulations. As Jonathan 
and Maggie’s comments show:
Cos it’s only a small ofice, you get to know 
the advisor a lot better, at [X place] they 
were very good, he got me on courses 
and that, I had him all the time, but when I 
moved to [Y place] they’re different people, 
you don’t get that relationship cos it’s a 
bigger ofice. (Maggie)
I’ve had some nice advisors, but some of 
them won’t do anything. (Jonathan)
Some advice and support was found to be 
counter-productive, particularly amongst 
respondents already engaged in training 
but who were prohibited from continuing, 
required to attend alternative (less valuable) 
courses/Work Programme, or who no longer 
had time to devote to independent activities 
because of job search conditions. 
Respondents rarely, if ever, found the 
activities provided through the beneit system 
more useful, effective, or appropriate than 
those they were independently engaged with. 
If their existing work-related commitments 
(training courses and such like) were being 
replaced by better, more effective, more 
appropriate training and activities then the 
shift would be positive but this was not 
often the case. Some respondents reported 
being sent on training courses that were 
inappropriate, that failed to increase an 
individual’s chance of getting work, and got 
in the way of meaningful engagement with 
the labour market. Participants were of the 
view that their time would have been better 
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spent doing more appropriate training or 
simply looking for work. Amrit, for example, 
was required to attend a two month basic 
course in forklift truck driving that he had 
already attended six months previously and 
not found useful the irst time. He asked to 
be enrolled on the higher level course but 
his request was denied. Brian recounts his 
experience of being sent on a basic training 
course despite having a 20 year work history 
in the following words:
I’ve worked all my life, I explained this to 
them and it was workshops on how to do a 
CV, how to conduct yourself in the interview, 
it was like how to boil an egg. I’ve worked 
since I was 17, I don’t need to know how 
to conduct an interview, I don’t need to 
know how to write my name and address, 
I explained all this, they passed everyone 
in, like I’m next to people in the groups that 
couldn’t speak English, people that have 
never worked in their life… (Brian)
Respondents’ views of Universal Jobmatch 
were relatively consistent. All respondents 
were in receipt of JSA or ESA WRAG so we 
would not expect to ind recent examples 
of positive outcomes (i.e. securing a job) 
from using the website. However, Universal 
Jobmatch appeared to be yielding no 
opportunities (interviews, contact with 
potential future employers) for those 
participating in this study. Three key concerns 
emerged in relation to Universal Jobmatch:
• Hardly ever receiving a courtesy response 
acknowledging applications or informing 
respondents they had been unsuccessful 
securing an interview
• Extremely low success rates with 
respondents reporting making hundreds of 
applications without a single interview (or 
indeed a response of any kind)
Never get nothing, like over the last year I’ve 
probably applied for a couple of hundred 
jobs and not even had a no thank you, 
nothing… and some of the jobs you apply 
for, a month later they’re still on. (Gerry)
• Jobs remaining on Universal Jobmatch 
for months, as Gerry’s comment above 
indicates, arousing suspicion that they are 
not genuine vacancies. This also reduced 
the number of jobs available each week 
for respondents to apply for, a particular 
problem for those with high targets. 
This had a demotivating effect on 
respondents, some of whom were already 
low in conidence and had felt hopeful and 
optimistic about the opportunities they 
may be able to tap into through Universal 
Jobmatch and the wider support on offer. 
5.2 What works for homeless people?
Several factors emerged, and were identiied 
by respondents as making a positive 
difference to the experience and outcomes 
of work-related activity, and to respondents’ 
willingness to engage. Certain types of 
activity/support were also valued particularly 
highly by respondents. 
A trusting and supportive claimant/Work 
Coach relationship 
It was striking that positive experiences of 
Jobcentre Plus or the Work Programme were 
usually related to the relationship individuals 
were able to forge with their advisors. 
Supportive staff at Jobcentres and the Work 
Programmes made a signiicant difference to 
how people experienced the beneits system. 
Maggie described how her Work Coach 
helped her: 
She really helped me this woman [oficer 
at the jobcentre], I were panicking, she 
calmed me down and she said ‘we’ll make 
sure you get your money’ and she really 
persisted and were really good… (Maggie)
Key to this relationship was the extent to 
which respondents felt they were listened to, 
supported and understood. This is relected 
in the positive ways in which respondents 
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talked about other professionals with whom 
they had contact. Respondents were often 
receiving help from a range of support 
workers/professionals. Key professionals, 
who were knowledgeable and skilled in 
providing individualised, practical support 
were very much appreciated, but support 
that recognised emotional needs appeared 
to have the most positive impact. The most 
highly regarded professionals invariably 
considered respondents’ well-being, in a 
broader sense. This points to the importance 
of personal attributes, as articulated by Gerry 
and Helena: 
 …cos it’s not only about a job in my 
situation but about my overall well-being 
as well. I come from a family life that’s 
been dificult. (Helena)
Yeah you get a housing oficer here, a 
social worker and the social worker helps 
you and if you’ve got problems with 
beneit or you need to go to the dentist 
or they’ll help you phone the right places, 
they’re really helpful here [hostel]… Yeah 
and if you’re down and upset they’ll sit and 
speak to you and listen to you and if they 
can do something about it they’ll try and 
do something about it. (Gerry).
In contrast to Gerry’s key worker who would 
‘sit and speak to you and listen to you’, it 
was hard for participants to put their trust 
in someone who had limited time. What 
worked was having an advisor who would 
give them the time to go through and explain 
their requirements. Thus, the quality and 
time allocated to an interaction at the Work 
Programme, compared with Jobcentre Plus, 
made a difference to Dennis:
Well your jobseekers advisor has got 
something like four minutes to see you 
whereas you go to your advisor at the work 
programme, they’re in half hour segments 
and if you get talking and it overruns that’s 
all right. So there’s quite a difference. 
(Dennis)
Just as time constraints could undermine a 
positive claimant/advisor relationship, so too 
could the manner in which advisors related 
to respondents. Often already at a low ebb, 
respondents could be very sensitive to the 
way they were spoken to and the apparent 
attitude of others toward them. It was 
relatively common for respondents to report 
feeling ‘looked down on’ (Amrit) with advisors 
described as ‘snotty’ (Andy and Maggie). 
There was a sense that Jobcentre Plus staff 
failed to understand, or were not interested 
in their circumstances or the problems they 
were facing and so treated them with little 
understanding or compassion. This was 
sometimes contrasted with the experience of 
using voluntary sector agencies where they 
felt understood and valued. Helena makes 
this point: 
X is a charity supporting homeless people, 
they have qualiication courses as well as 
leisure courses, just to have people off the 
streets during the daytime, make them feel 
they’re progressing and not I’m just on the 
street… they treat somebody like you’re 
valuable. (Helena)
Individualised, tailored support 
When people were matched with a Work 
Coach who understood their particular 
needs they were more likely to be helped 
appropriately to seek suitable work. It was 
important that people saw the same advisor 
over time as this enabled the advisor to 
get to know them, their job history and 
skills, and keep updated about luctuations 
in respondents’ circumstances (changing 
housing and health for example). It also 
helped to match to appropriate training, as 
was the case with Gerry:
Well I had to go on a three week course 
cos when they said ‘are you computer 
literate, do you think you can do it, work 
out how to attach a CV?’ I said no so I went 
on a three week course and that did help 
cos now I know how to do it but before I 
had no chance, I didn’t know. (Gerry)
30 Homeless people’s experiences of welfare conditionality and beneit sanctions
This short course increased Gerry’s 
conidence in using a computer and enabled 
him to access Universal Jobmatch with 
greater ease. Interestingly, Gerry also pointed 
to the value of recognising that not everyone 
was starting on a ‘level playing ield’ and that 
those who struggled with IT, for example 
(including older people and those with literacy 
needs), should be given greater support, as 
he had experienced on his course:
There were a few older people that were 
on my course, they were 60 year old and 
they haven’t got a clue, and even they 
were teaching them… What they did say, if 
we didn’t pass the course in three weeks 
they would extend it till they thought they 
were… (Gerry)
In essence, what worked was having an 
advisor who was skilful in helping them to 
engage with employment and training but 
who also treated respondents as individuals, 
and took that approach to matching them to 
appropriate training and the jobs market. The 
individualised approach also worked well 
for Anisa who had mental health issues and 
cared for her daughter at weekends: 
I don’t want to be on beneits. But I don’t 
want to get a full time job where it cuts 
off all my beneits and I’m going to have 
to pay everything out of my own pocket, 
I’ll just be working towards paying rent 
and I won’t even have anything for other 
expenses. So me and my advisor are 
trying to ind a job where it’s not going 
to take a toll on me, something that I can 
get working tax credits and there’s a lot 
of things I can get when I’m working but 
I just need that right amount, type of job, 
right amount of hours, there’s a lot that 
they look at. My job search is quite a big 
range but it’s quite limited as well because 
I don’t want a full time job, and also I get 
my daughter every weekend, Saturday and 
Sunday so I can’t work at the weekend. So 
it’s not just I can’t get a job, it’s cos of my 
restrictions. (Anisa)
It was common for respondents to bemoan 
the apparent ‘one size its all’ approach of 
some Work Coaches who, some respondents 
felt, were not considerate to their skills and 
employment preferences and who, as a 
result, referred clients to courses that did 
little to improve employability (see Chapters 
4 and 7.6. for further discussion). When 
asked how the current system could be 
improved, a more tailored system of support, 
and appreciation of claimants’ skills were 
commonly mentioned. For example: 
Box 5.1. Variable experiences  
of in-system support
It was interview skills and mock interviews, I went 
there for my job search, I went up there more than 
I had to cos I quite liked it and I had people there 
all the time, different workers, there was always 
somebody to help you out. (Sonia)
Yeah I went on a two week course which were no help 
whatsoever, all I did were make a CV that were all in the 
whole two weeks... and the work groups they put you 
on, the one I went on recently…there were a different 
person [instructor] every day and they had no idea what 
they were doing…they had us doing job search and 
CVs every day for two weeks, there were no advice on 
techniques for interviews or anything like it said it should 
have been…I were actually looking forward to getting 
some techniques but I didn’t get them. (Jonathan)
I seen this one [Work Coach] one day and he was 
virtually reading the jobcentre rule book, if you don’t 
do this you’ll be sanctioned, if you don’t do that 
you’ll be sanctioned, and I said ‘yes but I am doing 
it so why are you talking about sanctioning?’ Others, 
they’re more easy. (Dennis) 
Well sometimes I’ve got a personal advisor and he’d 
give you help and tips and things and they’re quite 
helpful, that was the aim of the work programme 
wasn’t it, to give you extra assistance. (Graham) 
They’ll help me with anything I need…yeah they are 
helping me get a job, well they’re not really helping, 
they just show me the paths and give me ideas of 
what to do and then I’ll go off and do it. (Anisa)
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Finding jobs themselves for people and 
having it more ‘have you got the skills for 
this’ and picking people out of a pool and 
saying ‘we’re recommending you for this 
job’…having a database of people and 
matching the skills with the jobs that come 
up, having employers speak to the jobcentre 
and say ‘we need ive staff have you got 
anyone suitable?’ and then putting people 
forward…whereas if you leave it it’s more a 
job that’s not suited to people…the system 
deinitely doesn’t work anyway. (Martin)
Flexibility, discretion and a non-directive 
approach 
It was important to respondents that there 
was enough lexibility in the system to be 
allowed to have choices and preferences. 
When respondents felt like an individual 
needing assistance rather than ‘just a number’ 
they were more likely to engage positively 
with the system of support offered through 
the beneit system. Anisa had a very positive 
experience of one of her Work Coaches. 
Crucially, she gave Anisa the impression she 
had some control over her searches:
She’s just really understanding and she 
asks me all the time ‘are you sure you want 
this?’ and also she’ll be ‘think about it and 
come back to me with the answer’ she 
doesn’t put me on the spot, that’s what I 
really like. Cos I feel like sometimes they 
tell you ‘do you want to do this?’ and you 
feel you have to say yeah, I feel like if I say 
no it might be the wrong answer and then 
they stop my claim or something. (Anisa)
Brian describes his ideal scenario (for a Work 
Programme session) in similar terms: 
An actual careers advisor sitting down 
and discussing options, but helping you, 
not telling you, giving you options, ideas, 
not dictating but just telling you here’s 
what’s available, colleges, grants, courses, 
do you want to, not you have to, offering 
help and not telling you what you have to 
do. (Brian)
Indeed a key reason for respondents’ 
exclusively positive views of the work-related 
activity (courses, volunteering, support) 
provided to them by the voluntary sector was 
that they had choice and control over their 
activities, so as to guarantee relevance and 
value in terms of improving employability.  
Volunteer training 
Two respondents reported having been on 
a work placement via the Work Programme 
and both emphasised how valuable this 
had been and how much they had enjoyed 
being gainfully employed during this period. 
One other respondent was due to start his 
placement in a hotel and felt similarly positive 
about the prospect:
It was when I was actually on the placement, 
I really thought that was good, not the 
sitting in the classroom stuff but actually 
hands on work, I didn’t care I was getting 
£30 extra on my job seekers, I was working, 
I wanted to do it… It was brilliant, I really 
enjoyed it, but you only do one training 
thing a year and it only lasts for four weeks, 
I wished it had lasted longer. (Kyle)
I’m happy to do it cos it’s experience and 
I can put it on my CV but there might not 
even be a job at the end of it …but I’m 
just going to try my hardest and show I’m 
willing and capable and hope there’s a job 
for me. (Martin)
Respondents talked in similar terms about 
their experience of volunteering through 
voluntary sector organisations.
I volunteered here for a while, I enjoyed 
that... I enjoyed helping out here for a 
while, I loved it… (Brian)
It was important to respondents, however, 
that they gained valuable skills and 
experience through volunteering/placements 
and had some prospect of securing paid 
employment as a result. Gerry, who had 
no direct experience of volunteering, was 
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sceptical that this was the case, and was 
deterred from such activity as a result:
Once you’ve been on long term for a year 
you have to go on the Work Programme 
which involves you being sent to a 
warehouse for eight weeks where you’ve 
got to work for nothing to gain your skills 
what I’ve already got, and they’re saying at 
the end of this they might set you on but 
they won’t cos they know after they’ll get 
somebody else for eight weeks. (Gerry)
IT training and dedicated IT tutors 
Developing basic IT skills, including sending 
emails, attaching CVs and doing a universal 
job search (all minimum requirements) 
emerged as a key factor in respondents’ 
ability to reach their individual job search 
targets. It was also a signiicant barrier to 
engagement for some, as we saw in Chapter 
4. Respondents who were not IT or internet 
proicient greatly valued the computer skills 
courses and support offered to them by 
Jobcentre Plus and by the day centres and 
charities whose services they used. Several 
thought more could be done to increase 
or improve this offer, however, with some 
identifying it as a crucial gap in the support 
package available. The value of having 
dedicated IT tutors was suggested by Adam: 
There should be more IT, not training, tutors, 
more IT tutors for people that… cos when 
you go and sign on and see a worker they’re 
just sitting at a desk typing but they should 
have separate workers that should be able 
to sit down and if you’re not sure on a 
computer they should be engaging instead 
of having to wander round the jobcentre 
going to look for somebody to help cos 
that’s frustrating. (Adam)
The difference such a course made to Dennis  
and the boost to his self-esteem from having 
accomplished something in the irst day - 
comes through clearly in his comment below:
I done a computer course, I could use a 
computer, log in, send emails…it was four 
weeks, cos they got me a bus pass so I could 
go in, I went in, the irst day I was there I went 
through this one programme and he said 
‘you’re ready for the test’ it was on computer 
security, I got 98 per cent. (Dennis)
5.3. Key points
• Respondents’ experiences of the in-
system help and support provided through 
the beneit system were so variable it is 
dificult to draw any conclusions about the 
merits and effectiveness of the different 
components of in-system support. Certainly 
some described helpful Work Coaches and 
useful courses, but others felt they were 
treated with disdain and sent on training that 
did nothing to improve their employability. 
• Universal Jobmatch appeared to be 
yielding no meaningful opportunities for 
participants in this study. They reported 
extremely low success rates (hundreds 
of jobs applied for with no interview 
secured or response of any kind received), 
hardly ever receiving a courtesy response 
to applications and jobs remaining 
on the website for months, arousing 
suspicion that they were not genuine and 
undermining trust in the system. These 
experiences had a demotivating effect for 
respondents, many of whom already had 
relatively low self-esteem.
• What made a difference to respondents’ 
experiences of and outcomes in relation 
to work-related activity (in and outwith the 
system) was: a trusting and supportive Work 
Coach/key worker relationship; individualised, 
tailored support; a non-directive approach; 
volunteer training so long as it did not appear 
exploitative; and IT support. 
• Although respondents had been provided 
with valuable support through the beneit 
system, none found this more useful or 
effective than when it was provided through 
voluntary sector agencies and other 
professionals with whom they were in contact. 
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With no income for much of the duration 
of their sanction, survey and interview 
respondents described employing a range 
of strategies to meet their basic needs - 
to feed themselves; to stay warm while 
keeping energy costs to a minimum; and to 
travel to Jobcentre Plus, the library, or the 
Work Programme to continue meeting their 
Claimant Commitment. Table 6.1. shows the 
range of ways in which survey respondents 
managed, from ‘doing without’, to borrowing, 
to stealing, and with a heavy reliance on the 
voluntary and charitable sector. It is notable 
that more respondents had gone hungry, 
visited food banks and other charities, and 
had stolen essential items as had received a 
hardship payment.
The survey results were consistent with the 
ways in which in-depth interview respondents 
coped without funds while sanctioned. 
Respondents described borrowing from 
friends, family and loan sharks (for cash 
and food) and ‘going without’; housed 
respondents stopped using heating or 
hot water, and everyone ate badly or 
intermittently. The only coping strategies 
which emerged in addition to those speciied 
by survey respondents were: selling personal 
items such as furniture and white goods; and 
accruing debt on amenities and facilities for 
which respondents were billed (gas, electricity, 
water, phone). These options were typically 
available only to those who were housed.  
This chapter considers some of these 
strategies for coping in more detail: we use 
the term ‘getting by’ or ‘coping’ rather loosely 
because, as we will see, it is questionable 
whether eating one meal a day, turning the 
heating off in winter, or seeing prison as a 
preferable option constitutes ‘getting by’ in 
any reasonable sense.   
6.1 Hardship payments
Hardship payments, usually paid at 60 per 
cent of claimants’ JSA/ESA, are available for 
people who cannot meet their basic needs 
as a result of a sanction. For claimants 
on Universal Credit, hardship payments 
are a loan and are time-limited (although 
subsequent applications can be made) while 
for those on JSA or ESA they are paid as 
a grant and continue for the duration of a 
sanction. Claimants are expected to have 
done all they can to secure income from other 
sources before they apply.
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%
Gone hungry or skipped meals 77
Gone without heating 64
Borrowed from friends or family 64
Got food/essentials from a charity other than a food bank 63
Received a food parcel from a food bank 61
Stole food, toiletries or other essentials 38
Received a hardship payment 36
Begged 28
Took out a loan from a loan shark or pay day lender 19
Table 6.1. Have you done any of the following as a result 
of having beneit stopped due to being sanctioned? 
(sanctioned survey respondents reporting ‘yes’)
Base: 212
 
 
Borrowing 
money
Shoplifting
Going 
without
Help from 
friends and 
family
Loan Sharks
Selling 
possessions
Charities/soup 
kitchens
Food banks
Begging
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Over one-third (36 per cent) of sanctioned 
survey respondents had received a hardship 
payment, leaving a signiicant proportion 
(64 per cent) who had not. The picture was 
very similar amongst survey respondents 
and those who did access the hardship fund 
usually did so intermittently, only having 
income from this source for a proportion of 
the time they were sanctioned. 
Following recommendations made by 
Matthew Oakley in his independent 
review of JSA Beneit Sanctions in 2014, 
the Government committed to improve 
information and communication about 
hardship payments.27 The evidence from 
this study raises questions about the 
effectiveness of measures to better inform 
sanctioned claimants about hardship payments. 
Many sanctioned respondents interviewed 
in-depth did not recall being informed about 
hardship payments and some of those 
who did access them found out about it 
from friends and acquaintances. David, 
for example, explained that ‘I looked on 
Facebook and one of my family or friends said 
“apply for it”.’ When asked whether Jobcentre 
Plus staff had informed him about hardship 
payments, Phillip, similarly, reported that ‘no 
they didn’t, a homeless geezer told me, he 
said “apply for hardship, that’s the only thing 
you can do” and I’m “what’s hardship?”.’
Others knew about the fund but were 
deterred from applying by the waiting 
period, or by the requirement to repay the 
loan28 which, they felt, would only result in 
subsequent hardship. For example:
I haven’t even put it [hardship claim] 
through, I don’t see the point, cos it’s 
going to take all that time for my claim to 
go through. (Phillip)
You can claim for hardship in a couple of 
weeks’ which were pretty pointless, I’m in 
hardship now, I’ve got to wait another two 
weeks before I can even claim hardship 
and after that I’ve got to wait another 
couple of weeks for the hardship to get 
accepted. (Paul)
I were told you can claim hardship fund 
but when your claim is processed they 
take that back what you’ve already had,  
so what’s point. (Gerry)
6.2 ‘Going without’
More than three quarters of survey 
respondents (77 per cent) went hungry or 
skipped meals during the period they were 
sanctioned and this was common amongst 
interview respondents also, who described 
rationing meals in order to get through the 
week:
You have to do a day eating and then [a 
day] not. (Jonathan)
You have to just limit yourself to [eating]…
when you feel like you’re getting 
depressed. (Helena)
Being forced to miss meals, then, was 
common, with the majority of interview 
respondents limiting themselves to one meal 
a day at most, or as Joe put it, ‘just living on 
my breakfast’. Others went ‘a couple of days’ 
(Priya) without eating or ‘lived off biscuits’ 
(Paul). Ja described his complicated meal 
planning: 
I’d come here [day centre] on Monday for 
food, they might have a couple of loaves 
of bread what you’d be able to take so 
I would be able to use that for the next 
couple of days. Or it would be Monday 
27  https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ile/332137/jsa-sanctions-independent-review-government-re-
sponse.pdf
28 It is not clear how well informed respondents were with regard to whether a hardship payment would be repayable in their case. Most were 
claiming JSA or ESA and so would not have to repay. 
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have nothing to eat, Tuesday have nothing 
to eat, come here Wednesday and get 
something to eat here Wednesday and 
then Thursday you used to be able to get a 
breakfast at another church at the bottom 
and Friday come back here, Saturday 
nowhere to go on a Saturday, but there is 
now, John has opened up a place called 
X so you can go there now on a Saturday 
for breakfast, but nothing through the 
day so you’ve just got breakfast, but they 
do give you as much cereal as you want, 
scrambled egg on toast or summat like 
that, that runs till 12 o’clock but then 
you’ve got to go 12 o’clock till Sunday, 
there’s a place on Sunday you can go but 
they don’t open till 6 o’clock in night. (Ja)
Ja was relying on day centres for his meals 
and, as we will see in the next section, it 
was common for respondents to rely on 
food banks and other voluntary sector 
organisations in order to eat. These services 
were a lifeline to respondents and a crucial 
emergency measure but they were no 
substitute for steady income which allows 
for regular meal patterns. As Ja’s experience 
shows, respondents who turned to food 
banks, day centres, and soup runs had 
restricted and time-limited access to food 
during the hours of operation of those 
services and often went hungry in between. 
Food parcels lasted a fortnight at a stretch 
and many drop-in centres only served 
breakfast. Others were a bus journey away 
or charged a fee for meals, and although this 
was relatively small by normative standards, 
for those with no income at all it proved 
a struggle to raise. As one respondent 
explained, ‘if I can get 60p off a friend, I can 
get a bowl of soup [in here]’. 
Not everyone was comfortable using food 
banks and charities. For some, the prospect 
of having to access a food bank, or to ask for 
help with something as basic as food, illed 
them with such a sense of shame that it was 
easier to ‘go without’. Anisa, for example, 
explained that ‘I would be too embarrassed 
to go and ask anyone or to ask here’ while 
others, like Benjamin, felt that it was not ‘in 
their nature’ to ask for things: ‘I’m not that 
way inclined so I just stay in my room and 
read’. In a similar vein, some respondents 
played down skipping meals, like Anisa who, 
when asked whether there was anything 
she forewent, responded casually ‘just food 
sometimes’.
There was evidence of respondents having to 
‘adjust’ physically and mentally to hunger, and 
devising strategies to ignore it. They spoke of 
having to ‘go to my room and try and sleep 
it off’ (Anisa), ‘stay in; watch telly’ (Benjamin), 
or to ‘not think about food in the day’ at all 
(Phillip). Paul talked through his strategy of 
managing one meal a day by cutting short 
the time he spent awake: 
I try and stay in bed, sleep through most of 
the day and then get up, have my breakfast 
and then I’ve only got a little bit of time until 
I can go back to sleep again […] eating 
so early builds up your metabolism so 
you’re going to be hungry later on. If you 
don’t eat nothing in the morning chances 
are you could probably go all day without 
something to eat, that’s ine. (Paul)
Food was not the only essential that 
respondents reported ‘going without’. 
Survey results conirmed that 64 per cent 
of sanctioned respondents also went 
without heating. Unable to pay bills or to 
avoid (further) debt to utility companies, 
respondents switched off heating (often in 
winter) or turned off energy at the mains for 
prolonged periods. Ja explained how he 
had turned off the gas at the mains and had 
been without central heating or hot water 
for months; he improvised by using a small 
electric heater, and an electric shower and 
kettle for hot water. Stuart – who was living 
in social rented accommodation with his 
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brother when they were both sanctioned at 
the same time – described how they rationed 
money for electricity during the winter, limited 
themselves to two showers a week, and ‘just 
sat in the living room with covers around… it 
used to get really cold’.
6.3 Food banks and charities
It is perhaps no surprise that so many 
sanctioned respondents in this study turned 
to food banks and other voluntary sector 
services for food and other essentials. 
Recent evidence suggests a rapid surge 
in the use of food banks nationally with 
913,100 people being fed by Trussell 
Trust food banks in 2013/14, an increase 
of 163 per cent from the 2012/13 total of 
347,000.29 According to data collected by 
The Trussell Trust for 2013/14, problems 
with beneits emerged as a primary reason 
for food bank use. In 2013/14, 31 per cent 
of all UK referrals were attributed to ‘beneit 
delays’ and a further 17 per cent to ‘beneit 
changes’.30 Our survey found that 61 per 
cent of those sanctioned had received a 
food parcel from a food bank, and 63 per 
cent had received food assistance and 
other essentials from another charity as a 
direct result of their sanction. Food banks 
and other services were used primarily for 
food but additionally for toiletries, cleaning 
products, and even pet food.
It is worth noting that the voluntary sector 
was additionally relied upon heavily for 
advice and assistance with sanction-related 
issues such as help and advice with appeals 
and sanction-related Housing Beneit or rent 
arrears problems, or signposting and referrals 
to food banks and charities. 
Most of those interviewed had never used a 
food bank before being sanctioned and there 
were increases in the use of other services, 
as the following quotes illustrate:
I wasn’t using this [day centre] until I got 
sanctioned. (Alistair)
I used to go down there, the soup run, I’ve 
been using them for a year or so but I was 
getting paid [beneits] then. I used to go 
there once or twice a week in case I need 
it, but now it’s every day. (Amrit)
I weren’t coming in every day, I was 
coming in every other day but them four 
weeks [while sanctioned] I had to come in 
every day. (David)
We found two cases where Jobcentre Plus 
workers referred sanctioned respondents 
to a food bank but in most cases, it was 
word of mouth among friendship networks, 
signposting from hostel/advice workers, or 
chance that respondents were made aware 
of food banks and other services. This is 
illustrated in the quotes below:
…the parish church at St. Stephen’s, I was 
passing and I bumped into a guy I know 
and he said ‘I’m just round here for a meal’. 
I said ‘what do you mean, for free?’ He 
said ‘Aye, they provide you with a three-
course meal’. (Adam)
I walked up the street and I seen the 
queue and I thought ‘what’s this?’ Loads 
of people lining up, so I lined up with them, 
and it was ‘here you are mate, have some 
pasta’ […] and that’s what I’ve been doing 
for the past couple of weeks, going to the 
soup runs and that. (Phillip)
Respondents often structured their days 
around the opening hours of particular 
services with the receipt of food and other 
necessities the ultimate priority of their day. 
Amrit, for instance, would ‘come here [the 
day centre] in the morning, have a shower, 
food and then food in town’. 
29  Source: http://www.trusselltrust.org/stats; rounded to nearest 100  
30 Beatty, C., Eadson, W. and Foden, M. (2015) Food bank provision for families in North Nottinghamshire. Shefield, Centre for Regional Economic 
and Social Research. 
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6.4 Help from friends and relatives
Respondents called upon support from 
friends, family and neighbours during the 
time they were sanctioned. Our survey 
revealed that 64 per cent of those 
sanctioned had borrowed from a friend or 
family member as a result of having their 
beneits stopped due to being sanctioned. 
Qualitative evidence from interviewing 
further substantiates this. But respondents 
did not only borrow money from friends and 
relatives; there were numerous examples 
of respondents eating meals at a relative’s 
house, receiving food donations from lat 
mates, hitching lifts with neighbours, and 
using children’s computers for job searching. 
This informal support network often kicked 
in when living off support solely from the 
voluntary sector was found insuficient. 
However, not everybody could, or wanted 
to ask others for help. Although in most 
cases familial and related support was given 
unconditionally, it still came at a price for 
some respondents, who felt guilty about 
being dependent on people who were often 
struggling inancially themselves. In some 
cases it ruined relationships, as we will see in 
Chapter 7. 
Relying on friends and family to eat while 
sanctioned
I went to see my mum. ‘Cos she’s a 
pensioner she said “I can’t help you out 
with money but if I’m having a meal I’m 
willing to share”. (Gerry)
My brother’s girlfriend was making me 
sandwiches and things like that. He used 
to come and take me to his house and 
cook. (Fred)
My mum used to cook for me and give me 
food and I used to bring it here. (Iman)
I just go down the road to my friend’s 
house. Well, my friend runs a restaurant 
so I can go there and get a pizza or 
something. (Luke)
My mum would do anything for me food-
wise […] I go there sometimes for a good 
meal once a week. (Rick)
Family, friends and neighbours of sanctioned 
claimants often made sure they did not go 
hungry. Dennis’ neighbours, for example, 
offered him loaves of bread and gave him a 
lift to Jobcentre Plus to sign on:
Where I was living was full of pensioners 
and they were saying “I’ve just bought a 
loaf of bread and I’ve found I’ve got two  
in the freezer; you can have one of the 
frozen ones”.
One of them one day said to me “when 
do you sign on?” I said “tomorrow”. “How 
are you getting there?” I said “I’ll probably 
walk it” “No, you won’t, I’m going into 
town to do some shopping. I’ll wait for you 
and bring you back as well”.
It was common for respondents to eat meals 
at family or friends’ houses or spend time 
there keeping warm, and friends and family 
helped out inancially where they could. Anisa 
borrowed from her mum ‘once or twice’ so 
she could take her daughter out when she 
came to visit (she wasn’t allowed in the 
hostel). Iman visited his family frequently and 
his mum lent him the bus fare so he could 
continue to do so. Sometimes support was 
reciprocal, as in the case of Lee who cared 
for his parents in return for ‘bread and board’: 
‘my parents were keeping me. There was 
food in the house, so basically I was there 
to look after my mum, my mum was there 
to look after me’. In one exceptional case, 
it was a landlord who was supportive and 
understanding when Gerry could not afford to 
pay his rent: 
He’s a nice landlord, if he were a strict 
landlord he’d be saying “I’m not being 
funny but you’ve lived here for a month 
for free and you’ve given me no money” 
But he’s a friend so I’m lucky that way, he 
understands what’s happened. (Gerry)
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While support from family and peers was 
crucial (indeed, one respondent stressed 
he would have turned to crime without it), 
such support is not always available. Many 
respondents had dificult or non-existent 
relationships with parents and other family 
members while others’ families were 
struggling themselves. Helena, for example, 
came to the UK to study, work and to start 
a new life away from the family violence she 
knew in Germany. Having found this process 
to be more dificult than expected Helena 
signed on while continuing to look for work 
which she hoped would eventually fund a 
college course. When she was sanctioned 
support from family could not be relied upon; 
indeed Helena preferred sleeping rough on 
the streets to the thought of returning to her 
family in Germany: 
I didn’t want my old life back so instead of 
going back I decided to sleep on the streets 
in London and I never thought I would be 
able to do that instead of going back. (Helena)
Helena also made a more general point 
that at her age she should be independent 
enough to fend for herself - ‘I’m 30 years old, 
you can’t ask somebody to pay for you all 
the time.’ This was a view shared by others, 
making them reluctant to seek support from 
family. The shame of having to be dependent 
later in life was raised by Rick, for example, 
who said ‘my mum would do anything for me 
[…] but I’m 33, I should be able to look after 
myself moneywise’. Similarly, Joe hid his 
sanction from those closest to him and tried 
to manage on his own, not telling his sister 
(his one family member with whom he had 
contact) so as not to worry her. 
Where respondents did rely on support 
from family and friends, this was not always 
sustainable over extended periods. It could 
place pressure on relationships, eroding this 
important source of support. We return to this 
issue in Chapter 7.6 when we look at  
the impact of sanctions on social and  
familial relationships.  
6.5 Survival crime and begging
Of those survey respondents sanctioned in 
the past year, 38 per cent said they had 
stolen or shoplifted food, toiletries or other 
essentials, while 28 per cent reported 
begging as a direct result of having their 
beneits sanctioned. These strategies for 
getting by were generally only considered out 
of desperation. When faced with starvation, 
survival crime and begging seemed like 
rational choices. Stuart explained that he had 
been without food for days before shoplifting:
I’ve had to steal before, I’ve done a trolley 
dash and got caught for it. But I was in 
a really bad… I had no food for days […] 
So I went round the shop and illed the 
trolley and walked out and got a tap on 
the shoulder. “You’re nicked!” […] I was 
starving so that was it. I got charged for it. 
But that was cos it was really bad.
Respondents who had shoplifted were keen 
to emphasise that this was the irst time they 
had done so. Phillip (aged 21), who had been 
evicted from his hostel because his Housing 
Beneit had stopped after he had been 
sanctioned, told a similar story about why he 
chose to beg on one occasion:
It was 5 o’clock in the morning. I woke up 
and couldn’t feel nothing with the cold and 
that. Couldn’t feel the end of my ingers 
and my toes and then I just sat there and 
asked ‘have you got three quid mate?
Unfortunately the passers by Phillip approached 
were policemen and he was arrested. 
When respondents admitted shoplifting 
or begging it was usually articulated as 
necessity but others stole because they 
felt they had ‘nothing to lose’. In a number 
of cases, respondents actively tried to get 
caught shoplifting, seeing life in prison to be 
preferable to the destitution they were facing. 
Such acts illustrate the levels of despair 
some respondents reached, as articulated by 
Ja and Andy: 
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I was sat in my lat and I decided I’m going 
to go to Matalan and I’m going to get 
arrested and get locked up and sent away 
to jail cos I can’t cope with this world no 
more. So I went to Matalan…got loads 
of bags and started illing, in front of the 
security guard as well, I did it…and went 
outside and the security guard wouldn’t 
even arrest me, I was ‘come on arrest me 
please’ and he didn’t even realise…so I 
went back in the shop and said ‘look I’ve 
stole loads of clothes’ and I started to run, 
cos I wanted to be arrested…the security 
guard grabbed me round the neck and 
I went ‘inally’ and I broke down to the 
police oficer in the car and I went ‘inally I 
can go to jail and get away from the world’. 
(Ja) 
I’ve got nothing to lose if I go to jail, it’s a 
roof over my head and three square meals. 
(Andy)
Most, however, struggled instead, not 
wanting to risk getting caught and spending 
time in prison. Others said that shoplifting 
had crossed their minds as an option but 
they had not (yet) acted on it:
It’s come in my head, when you’re proper 
hungry and you’re walking past a shop 
and see a box of bread or something but 
I never acted on the thought, but it were 
always there. (Paul)
6.6 Key points
• When beneits are withdrawn following 
a sanction, claimants can - and many 
participating in this research did - ind 
themselves with no income. The evidence 
from this study suggests that only a 
minority (albeit a sizable minority - 36 
per cent) access hardship payments and 
that, in any case, these rarely cover the 
full duration of respondents’ sanction, or 
series of sanctions. 
• Respondents employed a range of 
strategies to meet their basic need while 
sanctioned, with the evidence suggesting 
that homelessness service users are 
having to ‘beg, borrow and steal’ to meet 
their daily needs while others are ‘going 
without’ essentials such as food. As many 
respondents reported having shoplifted 
as a direct result of their sanction as had 
received a hardship payment.
• Removing an individual’s means of income 
through sanctioning shifts ‘dependence’ 
from the welfare state to the voluntary 
sector and the family unit. Respondents 
relied on drop-ins, soup runs, faith-based 
organisations and the kindness of friends 
and family for food and support but none 
of these constituted a suficient enough 
replacement, nor a sustainable one.
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The core objective of welfare reform, of which 
the current conditionality and sanctions 
regime is a key component, is to encourage, 
support and incentivise more people into 
work. Government rationale for the use 
of sanctions is that they are effective in 
changing behaviour that will, in turn, reduce 
unemployment. The evidence reported in this 
chapter suggests that the sanctions regime 
does prompt some behavioural change, 
making homelessness service users more 
likely to comply with the conditions set down 
for them and seek work. However, being 
sanctioned also had a series of wider impacts 
on respondents’ lives; on their physical 
health, mental health, housing and social 
relationships. In this chapter we consider the 
intended and the unintended consequences 
of sanctions.
7.1 Intended outcomes: increased 
compliance and moving closer to 
the labour market
Respondents were asked a series of 
questions about the extent to which 
the threat of being sanctioned and the 
experience of being sanctioned had 
prompted changes in their behaviour such 
that they were more likely to comply with the 
conditions that would ultimately improve their 
chances of securing work
The possibility of being sanctioned amongst 
respondents subject to conditionality had 
prompted changes in behaviour. For example, 
respondents reported it had made them more 
likely to:
• Turn up for appointments (72 per cent of all 
JSA and ESA WRAG claimants, base: 512)
• Turn up on time (72 per cent)
• Take more notice of what their advisor 
asked them to do (63 per cent).
• Apply for jobs (60 per cent, or 71 per cent 
of JSA claimants)
• Look for jobs more often (55 per cent, or 
64 per cent of JSA claimants)
• Attend the courses/training they were told 
to attend (53 per cent)
• Find a job (20 per cent, or 23 per cent of 
JSA claimants)
Only a minority of respondents (16 per cent) 
did not report being inluenced by the threat 
of sanction in at least one of these ways - 
good news, perhaps, for the policy. Interview 
respondents also described making more 
concerted efforts to seek work following a 
sanction, to pay more attention to the detail 
of what their Work Coach asked them to do, 
and to check and double check appointment 
dates and times. 
Unfortunately analysis revealed very little 
about those groups most likely to be 
inluenced by the threat of sanction. Looking 
at the proile of respondents inluenced 
in at least one of the above ways (431), 
compared with all other claimants subject 
to conditionality (81), there were very few 
differences, including no stark differences 
between JSA and ESA WRAG claimants.31 
The only exceptions relate to distance 
from the labour market and educational 
qualiications, in perhaps counterintuitive 
ways:
• Those changing their behaviour in these 
ways in response to the possibility 
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31 The number of respondents subject to conditionality, aware of the possibility of being sanctioned and not inluenced by this threat was small – 
just 81 (out of 512) which might explain why sub-group analysis revealed few differences. For this reason we are reluctant to conclude that any 
one group is more or less inluenced by the threat or sanction.  
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of a sanction were less likely to have 
educational/vocational qualiications (62 
per cent, compared with 73 per cent); and
• They were less likely to have had a regular 
job in the past ive years (53%, compared 
with 62 per cent).
When considering behavioural change 
outcomes of actual sanctions, results are 
broadly similar, although the proportions 
changing their behaviour were lower, and 
substantially lower for inding a job. This 
is somewhat counterintuitive: one might 
expect the experience of being sanctioned to 
provide greater, not lesser, incentive to future 
compliance. Of all those sanctioned in the 
past year:
• 60 per cent made sure they turned up  
on time
• 58 per cent made sure they turned up for 
appointments
• 56 per cent took more notice of what they 
were asked to do.
• 45 per cent looked for jobs more often
• 42 per cent started attending the courses/
training they were told to attend
• 7 per cent found a job
The sanctions system is premised upon the 
notion that some individuals need coaxing, 
and need the threat of sanctions, to engage 
in work-related activity. However, as we 
saw in Chapters 2 and 3, the willingness 
to engage with the system already existed 
and sanctions were often imposed because 
of systemic problems, inappropriate 
requirements, missing communication 
(letters), and honest mistakes. In-depth 
interviews with sanctioned respondents 
suggests that they often did make even 
more concerted efforts to comply following 
a sanctioning - checking appointment times 
more carefully, recording job search activity 
more rigorously - but their disposition was 
unchanged, because they were already 
positively disposed to taking advantage  
of support and training, and towards  
seeking work. 
Thus, amongst those who felt they were 
capable of work, when asked whether the 
threat or experience of sanction made them 
more likely to look for or take up a job, a 
common refrain was yes, but ‘I’ve always 
tried to work anyway’ (Graham). As Maggie 
explained when asked if being sanctioned 
had any inluence on her efforts to comply 
with her conditions: 
I did that anyway but make sure I look at 
plenty of jobs, which I did, make sure I did 
what the letters said, basically that’s just 
what I do. (Maggie)
It is also important to make clear that the 
threat and/or experience of being sanctioned 
did prompt behaviour change in some 
respondents but only through instilling fear 
and anxiety. In these instances respondents 
were complying, not because their attitude 
toward job-seeking had changed but 
because they were terriied at the prospect of 
living again with no income. To describe this 
as positive behaviour change is dubious: 
It was torture going up to the jobcentre…
you’re a nervous wreck, you don’t sleep 
the night before it. (Graham)
My anxiety affects me, I get really bad 
panic attacks…the night before my sign on 
I can’t sleep, I feel like I’m thinking about it 
so much, and so anxious. (Anisa)
7.2 Unintended outcomes: overview
In addition to the ‘intended consequences’ of 
sanctioning, being sanctioned had a series 
of wider impacts on respondents’ lives. The 
consequences of living ‘hand to mouth’, over 
a sustained period of time in some instances, 
were severe and evidence emerged from this 
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study that being sanctioned increased the 
chance of respondents becoming homeless, 
and it impacted on mental and physical 
health; self-esteem and conidence; family 
relationships and parenting; work-related and 
other behaviours; inancial circumstances; 
and engagement with the labour market. 
Figure 7.1 shows that three quarters of those 
who had been sanctioned reported that it 
had negatively impacted on their mental 
health and 64 per cent said it had affected 
their physical health in a negative way. Being 
sanctioned also impacted negatively on 
the very things that the conditionality and 
sanctions regime is meant to positively 
inluence: respondents’ ability to look for 
work (60 per cent); secure or maintain a job 
(53 per cent); and continue with training or 
courses (42 per cent). Half of all respondents 
sanctioned felt it had had a negative effect 
on their ability to maintain permanent or 
temporary housing. It can also be seen clearly 
that the prevalence of negative effects on 
ESA WRAG claimants was greater in every 
instance than for JSA claimants.
Survey evidence suggests that it is the most 
vulnerable who are impacted the worst. 
We can see from the statistics presented that 
ESA WRAG respondents were more likely 
than JSA respondents to report negative 
effects but respondents with mental health 
problems or alcohol/drug dependency were 
also more likely than those without these 
issues to report each of these negative 
effects as a result of being sanctioned.
The experiences of qualitative interview 
respondents concurred with those reported 
by survey respondents but the impact of 
being sanctioned on mental health and 
well-being, and on housing, emerged 
particularly strongly. The remainder of this 
chapter considers some of these ‘unintended 
consequences’ of sanctions.
7.3 Housing and homelessness
A signiicant number of survey and interview 
respondents reported that being sanctioned 
Figure 7.1. Did being sanctioned have a negative impact on any of the following?
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had detrimentally affected their housing 
situation. This was true for those who were 
permanently housed at the time of their 
sanction and those living in temporary 
accommodation. Half of all sanctioned 
survey respondents said being sanctioned 
had a negative effect on their ability to 
maintain their permanent or temporary 
housing (JSA: 43 per cent, ESA WRAG: 60 
per cent). Predominantly, this was because 
respondents struggled to pay their rent or 
service charges while sanctioned, as was the 
case for Lee and Jonathan:
I had my own property and cos Housing 
Beneit’s not getting paid that’s got took 
off me, I was made homeless… (Lee)
I lived in the Salvation Army [hostel], that’s 
when I got my irst sanction…I got evicted 
from the Salvation Army coz I couldn’t pay 
my rent. (Jonathan)
Housing Beneit (HB) entitlement is 
usually unaffected by a beneit sanction. 
The exception is claimants subject to 
intermediate sanctions. Intermediate 
sanctions are imposed on JSA claimants 
who fail to be available for work or actively 
seeking work. Eligibility for JSA relies upon 
a claimant being available for and actively 
seeking work and so these claimants 
become disentitled to JSA and their claim 
is cancelled. The sanction is then imposed 
when they reclaim. Because there has been 
an interruption to eligibility, all passported 
beneits, including HB, will also cease and a 
fresh claim has to be made. 
In practice, however, HB claims are 
sometimes suspended when low and high 
level sanctions are imposed, as well as 
intermediate sanctions. This is because 
sanctioned claims are included in the daily 
automatic notiication sent by DWP to 
local authorities of JSA/ESA claims that 
have ‘stopped’. Unable to easily distinguish 
sanctioned claims from claims that have 
stopped for reasons of eligibility (where 
entitlement to HB is also likely to be affected), 
local authorities often suspend all these HB 
claims pending further information.
This issue was highlighted by Matthew 
Oakley in his independent review of JSA 
Beneit Sanctions in 2014 (Oakley, 2014) and, 
in its response to the review, the Government 
committed to resolve the problem in the short 
term by ensuring that claimants are advised 
to keep the local authority informed of their 
circumstances; and in the long term by 
implementing an IT ix (DWP 2014). When the 
Work and Pensions Committee questioned 
the Minister for Employment in February 2015 
about progress on this issue she explained 
that DWP had investigated 300 cases and 
found no evidence of this occurring and 
announced the problem resolved (Work 
and Pensions Committee, 2015). However, 
incidences have continued to emerge and, 
in response, DWP are working internally 
and with local authorities and charitable 
organisations to understand and rectify this 
problem. In early October DWP issued an 
urgent circular to local authorities conirming 
that sanctioned claimants should continue 
to receive HB without interruption, indicating 
that the problem has been continuing.
Information from claimants and stakeholders 
certainly suggests that the problem persists, 
and that DWP are right to continue with 
their efforts to better understand the 
issue. A senior oficer interviewed from 
the organisation providing the Housing 
Beneit service in one large city, for example, 
conirmed that (at May 2015) an automated 
system suspends the HB of most of the 100 
or so notiications they receive daily from 
DWP of ‘stopped’ claims, and generates 
a letter, sent to the claimant, asking them 
for further information. If they do not hear 
from the claimant within a month the HB 
claim is cancelled and in the meantime it is 
suspended. 
This chimes with the experiences of survey 
and interview respondents. More than 
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one-third of the 146 survey respondents 
claiming HB when they were sanctioned 
reported that their HB stopped as a result 
(JSA: 35 per cent, ESA WRAG: 38 per cent). 
In some cases this may have been the result 
of an intermediate sanction, but certainly not 
in all. ESA WRAG respondents, for example, 
are not subject to intermediate sanctions 
and, of the similar proportion of interview 
respondents whose HB stopped following a 
sanction, very few appeared to have had an 
intermediate sanction imposed.  
Very few interview respondents understood 
accurately the relationship between their JSA/
ESA sanction and HB claim - as the quotes 
below illustrate - and so most failed to take 
the action necessary to maintain their claim. 
Very few were advised by Jobcentre Plus to 
contact the HB department (although in some 
cases respondents’ HB continued despite 
taking no action) and those who eventually 
contacted the HB department often did 
so only when they received notiication of 
arrears from their landlord or hostel provider. 
Some had given it no thought at all, others 
assumed their HB was also subject to the 
sanction and expected it to cease, and 
others assumed it was unaffected and would 
continue without any action being needed. 
Some respondents thought it depended on 
the area you lived in, or the length of the 
sanction. The extent of misapprehension is 
illustrated in the quotes below:  
When they stop your beneit totally you’re 
not entitled to Housing Beneit any more 
so you cannae pay your rent. (Alistair) 
I think what it depends on is the council…
this is Leamington Spa…if you went 20 
miles down the road to Coventry then 
everything gets stopped, Housing Beneit, 
everything so I think it depends on the 
council. (Dennis)
They [HB] carried on cos it was such 
a short period…if I hadn’t phoned the 
Work Programme the next day that would 
have been it, I would have been properly 
sanctioned, not just a couple of weeks, 
it would have been months and then 
Housing Beneit would have been affected, 
Council Tax. (Lewis)
Under the misapprehension that HB 
eligibility ceases along with a sanction, 
some respondents were reluctant to 
tell their hostel provider they had been 
sanctioned, fearing this could jeopardise 
their accommodation. This was true of 
Melanie who explained that ‘I was scared 
about telling them cos I’m always scared of 
losing my bed here’. As a result, she did not 
access timely help and advice from hostel 
workers that could have prevented her 
arrears building up, such as help to appeal 
her sanction, or advice to contact the HB 
department to have HB reinstated.
Claimants whose HB continues to be paid, 
and those who are not claiming HB are also 
at risk of falling behind with their housing 
costs. This is because some housing costs 
are covered from JSA/ESA income, rather 
than HB. For example: 
HB does not always fully cover a tenant’s 
rent, even for those on a passported beneit 
(i.e. eligible for ‘full’ HB). Recent changes, 
including the lowering of the rent rate payable 
to private rented sector tenants and the Removal 
of the Spare Room Subsidy (known as the 
‘bedroom tax’) have left many tenants with a 
shortfall to make up from other income. Gerry, 
for example, was living in a private rented 
lat when he was sanctioned. His rent was 
£98 per week but the rate payable (the ‘Local 
Housing Allowance’) by HB was £78 so Gerry 
paid £20 per week from his JSA, a sum he 
could no longer pay once he was sanctioned.
‘Rent’ sometimes includes charges for 
services or amenities that HB does not cover. 
This is true in most homelessness hostels, 
where residents pay around £10-£15 each 
week from other income for service charges. 
Rick, for example, was living in a hostel 
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where he had to pay a service charge of £15 
a week. Once he was sanctioned this proved 
impossible and he stopped paying ‘which is 
why I got thrown out’.
Homeless people staying temporarily 
with friends or relatives sometimes make 
an informal inancial contribution (board 
and lodging) from their JSA/ESA to that 
household. This was true of Martin, who was 
asked to leave when his sanction prevented 
him from contributing any longer.
People who have previously accrued 
arrears often have an arrangement with their 
landlord to repay a small amount each week 
a commitment they meet from JSA/ESA 
income. In some cases such arrangements 
must be honoured to avoid eviction. Stuart 
and his brother were joint tenants who were 
eventually evicted for rent arrears. Both 
received sanctions. Stuart explained that ‘we 
did have a payment plan but even with that 
my brother was getting sanctioned again and 
again as well so it just couldn’t work.’
If we consider the numbers of respondents 
whose HB stopped when they were 
sanctioned, and the fact that JSA/ESA 
income is often used to cover some 
housing costs it is perhaps no surprise 
that nearly half of sanctioned survey 
respondents reported falling behind with 
their housing costs as a result of being 
sanctioned (see Table 7.1). This included 
rent, service charges, and informal inancial 
contributions made to households with 
whom a respondent was staying temporarily. 
It is worth remembering here that not all 
sanctioned respondents will have been 
liable for housing costs at the time of their 
sanction (including those sleeping rough 
or staying with friends without inancial 
obligation) and so the proportion of those 
with housing costs who fell into arrears will 
be higher.
The level of arrears respondents accrued 
varied, depending on the length of their 
sanction, whether and how quickly they 
contacted the HB department, whether they 
received a letter from the HB department 
notifying them of HB suspension (very 
few did), whether and how quickly they 
successfully appealed their sanction, and 
how quickly their landlord made them aware 
of arrears accruing. Interview respondents 
reported arrears ranging from around £100 to 
£4,000. At least four interview respondents 
had accrued arrears of more than £1,000 
on their own tenancy as a result of being 
sanctioned, only one of whom had been in 
arrears at that address previously. 
Not paying one’s rent carries with it 
serious risk of eviction and, therefore, of 
homelessness. Anyone failing to pay their 
rent will be breaching the condition of their 
tenancy/residency. Table 7.1 shows that 
for 21 per cent of sanctioned survey 
respondents, not being able to pay 
housing costs meant having to leave their 
temporary or permanent accommodation 
(this was true for a higher proportion of ESA 
WRAG claimants than JSA claimants: 27 per 
cent and 17 per cent respectively). 
When asked directly, 21 per cent of 
sanctioned survey respondents said 
they became homeless as a result 
of being sanctioned but had not been 
homeless immediately before their  
sanction and 16 per cent said they had  
to sleep rough as a result of the sanction, 
but had not been sleeping rough 
immediately before their sanction. 
Homelessness and rough sleeping  
resulting from a sanction were more common 
amongst ESA WRAG than JSA claimants: 
28 per cent of ESA WRAG and 16 per cent 
of JSA claimants surveyed said they had 
become homeless as a result of being 
sanctioned and 22 per cent of  
ESA WRAG and 12 per cent of JSA 
claimants said they had slept rough as a 
result of being sanctioned. 
A very similar picture emerged from the 
46 Homeless people’s experiences of welfare conditionality and beneit sanctions
in-depth interviews, as the following quotes 
illustrate:
I were £300 in arrears, got given 24 hour 
notice to leave cos of rent arrears so I did. 
(Joe)
I had a private let house with X housing 
association [for 6 years] and cos I’ve had 
sanctions and getting my Housing Beneit 
stopped my debt went up to thousands of 
pounds…in February we got evicted. (Stuart)
In total, 12 of the 42 people interviewed had 
been evicted from their accommodation as 
a result of being sanctioned. In all cases, 
respondents had been unable to maintain 
rent (usually) or service charge payments, 
and accrued arrears beyond a level 
acceptable to their landlord or temporary 
housing provider. In one further instance, a 
respondent had been asked to leave his 
girlfriend’s parents’ house where he was 
staying temporarily because he could no 
longer contribute inancially to the household. 
Of the 13 respondents who had to leave 
their accommodation, eight had been living 
in their own tenancies. These respondents 
therefore became homeless as a direct result 
of being sanctioned. One further respondent 
was under threat of eviction from his 
housing association tenancy at the time of 
his interview and others had rent or service 
charge arrears steadily accruing.
Several of those who had lost settled 
accommodation as a result of being 
sanctioned had previously been homeless 
but, until their sanction, were sustaining 
their tenancy. For these respondents, being 
sanctioned reversed a positive trajectory, 
undermining the efforts of the respondent 
and the organisations who had advised 
and worked with them - sometimes over 
many years - to escape homelessness and 
overcome associated problems. Ja made this 
point in relation to his own circumstances. 
He had experienced a sustained period of 
homelessness (during which he managed 
to work consistently) after the breakdown of 
his marriage and a couple of years ago had 
secured a Housing Association lat. He was 
under threat of eviction at the time of his 
interview: 
You’re playing with people’s lives, do 
you realise what you’re doing to them, 
somebody who’s been homeless and has 
just got his stability back. He’s getting 
his life back, trying to build himself up 
on stepping stones. He’s ill already so 
basically you’ve made matters worse and 
you’re just knocking him back down all the 
time. (Ja)
Ross, similarly, had been homeless for 10 
years following an accidental ire in his home 
(during this time Ross also had mental health 
and drug dependency issues). When he met 
Table 7.1. Did receiving a sanction affect your housing situation in any of the following ways?
%
I got behind with the rent in my temporary accommodation and was evicted 13
I got behind with the rent in my temporary accommodation but was not evicted 16
I got behind with the rent in my own accommodation and my tenancy was terminated/
not renewed/I was evicted
4
I got behind with the rent in my own accommodation but I was not evicted/my tenancy 
was not terminated
9
I could no longer stay with family or friends as I had no money to contribute 4
None of the above 51
Don’t know/not sure 3
Total 100
Base 212
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his partner they moved into a rented lat 
together and she became pregnant. They 
suffered a great sadness when she was 
knocked down by a car, seriously injured, and 
lost their baby. Ross was then sanctioned 
following a mix up about the location of an 
appointment (see Box 3.1 in Chapter 3) and 
his Housing Beneit stopped being paid. 
Ross explained that ‘after that it was sanction 
upon sanction’ although from the details he 
provided it seems there were also a series 
of other complications with his claim that, 
combined with sanction periods, left him 
with no income for more a year. With £4,000 
of rent arrears they were evicted just before 
Christmas, less than two years after Ross 
had secured settled housing after a decade 
of homelessness (See Figure 7.2): 
I’ve had enough, I’m nearly having a 
breakdown. It’s been a 10 year uphill 
struggle and I’m still homeless and 
everything I’ve been through, it’s all been 
stacked against me. (Ross)
A similar pattern was evident amongst 
homeless respondents who had previously 
been sleeping rough, who had accessed 
a hostel as a irst step towards settled 
accommodation, but had to return to rough 
sleeping when they accrued rent or service 
charge arrears. 
7.4 Mental and physical health
The experience of having beneits sanctioned 
had an effect on the mental health of most 
respondents. Three quarters of the survey 
respondents who had been sanctioned 
said this had a negative impact on their 
mental health and mental health impacts on 
some interview respondents were also clear. 
When asked to rank the effects of being 
sanctioned, 51 per cent identiied mental 
health impacts, and 40 per cent identiied 
physical health impacts, as one of the three 
main negative effects of being sanctioned, 
more than any other effect.
Many sanctioned respondents already 
suffered problems such as depression, 
anxiety, stress and panic attacks and some 
had diagnoses of schizophrenia and bipolar 
disorder. We know for example that 45 
per cent of respondents reporting mental 
ill health were sanctioned. Many were 
managing their illnesses effectively. The 
experience of being sanctioned, however, 
exacerbated these problems, occasionally to 
the point where respondents could no longer 
function. Respondents reported experiencing 
high and increased levels of anxiety when 
trying to deal with the impact of having little 
or no money on which to survive day-to-day. 
Those already struggling with mental health 
issues reported not being able to cope with 
the added and very real burden of being cut 
off from any means of welfare support. For 
those with a history of mental health issues, 
being sanctioned was a wholly negative 
experience which often resulted in increased 
depression. This led a signiicant minority 
to contemplate and carry out self-harming, 
and in the most extreme cases, suicide. Ja’s 
experience illustrates this point (see Box 7.1.) 
as he describes in graphic terms the mental 
health impact of his sanction and the wait to 
have his beneits. 
Ja wasn’t the only respondent who had a 
severe deterioration in his mental health 
to the point where he felt he could cope 
no longer and contemplated or carried out 
self-harm. Ross also explained that ‘I feel 
like topping myself rather than go through 
another day’ although, unlike Ja, he did not 
act on these feelings. 
In the same vein, feeling increasingly 
vulnerable and socially isolated was also 
a common experience, as articulated by 
Helena:
It’s just upsetting, when you’re alone you 
can’t do anything against it. You feel more 
vulnerable than you did before. (Helena)
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Being at the receiving end of sustained 
scrutiny and conditionality from Jobcentre 
Plus and/or the Work Programme was 
a source of anxiety for many and this 
could intensify following a sanction. Once 
respondents had experienced the dificulties 
of living without beneit income and, in some 
cases, been sanctioned despite best efforts 
to meet requirements or for unavoidable 
reasons (see Chapter 3) respondents became 
much more fearful of the prospect of being 
sanctioned again. Going to Jobcentre Plus 
and having appointments with job advisors/
Work Coaches were particular triggers for the 
onset of stress, and in a couple of instances, 
panic attacks. Anisa describes her increased 
anxiety at the thought of going to Jobcentre 
Plus in the following excerpt:
I suffer a lot from anxiety and I get panic 
attacks and I work myself up and when I get 
there it could be really simple but I just work 
myself up when I know it’s someone I don’t 
know, saying ‘you haven’t done it right’ 
or whatever. I think ever since I got the 
sanction it’s made my anxiety a lot worse… 
(Anisa)
By virtue of their precarious housing 
situations, our participants were already in a 
vulnerable position, which was exacerbated 
by beneit sanctions and the attendant 
conditionality regime. People reported 
feeling harassed by the constant need to 
comply with onerous JSA and to a lesser 
extent ESA WRAG conditions. It was hardly 
surprising then that many of them felt their 
conidence was undermined when they 
failed to meet their requirements. It was 
dificult for some people to keep up with 
the level of correspondence and demands 
for documentation, which had a deleterious 
effect on their self-esteem. Helena expresses 
the effect on her efforts to remain conident 
and retain her self-esteem in the face of an 
over-bearing beneits regime:
The people [at Jobcentre Plus] don’t 
really know you, they could make false 
assumptions, I have so much going on 
I feel like… these letters make it worse, 
instead of trying to be conident I feel 
like these letters, being pushed down, it 
just gets down, down and I don’t know 
how I’m going to feel if this situation isn’t 
resolved for me. (Helena)
The effects of being sanctioned on 
participants’ physical health were also 
notable, although not easily measurable. As 
Ross described it ‘my health has deteriorated 
ever since they stopped my money and I’ve 
History Recent History Beneits and Sanctions Impact – Current Situation
Homeless for 10 
years following a ire 
in his accommodation
Mental health 
issues/psychosis
Substance abuse 
issues
Met partner, moved into 
a rented lat together
In 2013 his pregnant 
partner is knocked down 
by a car and loses her 
baby
Waiting for nearly a year 
for a decision on Carer’s 
Allowance for partner
Confusion about signing 
so received a sanction
No money for a year
Relationship breakdown 
due to stress and lack of 
money 
Evicted due to rent 
arrears   
Encouraged to claim JSA 
after ‘being on the sick for a 
long time’
Sanctioned following a 
misunderstanding about 
the location of an 
appointment
Followed by ‘sanction upon 
sanction’ combined with 
other complications with 
his claim (moving from JSA 
to ESA, from a single to 
joint claim and claiming 
Carer’s Allowance)
HB stopped when he was 
sanctioned and was never 
reinstated
Approximately 18 months 
virtually no income
Homelessness
Evicted from rented lat
Slept rough, in B&B and hostels
Debt
£4000 rent arrears
Mental Health
Feeling hopeless/suicidal
Family relations
Exhausted family support
Relationship breakdown
Physical Health
Involuntary fasting
Weight loss two and a half stone
Use of support services
Increased use of day centres for food and meals 
Use of medical serivces at the day centre
“I feel like topping myself 
rather than go through 
another day”
“I’m going cold and 
hungry”
“My family got right 
tired of me”
“I put it down to sanctions that my 
health has deteriorated so much. 
I’m getting better now but I went 
down from 111/2 stone to 9 stone”
“And my health has deteriorated 
ever since they stopped my 
money and I’ve not been eating 
well and all the walking I have to 
do just to see my girl and survive”
Figure 7.2 Ross
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not been eating well and all the walking I 
have to do just to see my girl and to survive.’
Negative physical health effects were evident 
mostly in relation to ‘involuntary fasting’; and 
insomnia and lack of sleep, as described by 
Anisa in section 7.1. In total, 64 per cent of 
the survey sample reported a negative impact 
on their physical health. Going without food, 
in effect ‘involuntary fasting’ was a recurring 
theme in people’s narratives. Intermittent and 
involuntary fasting, as a strategy for coping 
(as discussed in Chapter 6) with time-limited 
access to food, had a negative impact on 
people’s health. Signiicant weight loss 
was not uncommon. This was discussed 
in visceral, corporeal terms by Ja, who 
described the experience of being able to 
eat only on certain days and certain times 
(at soup kitchens and other drop-in centres 
run by the voluntary sector), and the physical 
effects on his body. He described signiicant 
weight loss (4 stone) and shrinking appetite 
so that even when a meal was available he 
felt physically unable to eat it. Ja explained 
that not having eaten from Saturday morning 
to Sunday evening, when faced with a large 
meal ‘you can’t even eat that meal cos your 
belly’s that full already cos you’ve swelled 
your stomach up’.
7.5 Family, parenting and social 
relationships
Being at the receiving end of beneit 
sanctions affected the individual claimant but 
also had an impact on their family and friends. 
In many cases family members, including 
parents and siblings, were the irst port of call 
as people found themselves unable to meet 
their most basic needs. We saw in Chapter 
6 that 64 per cent of survey respondents 
borrowed from friends or family as a result 
of having their beneit stopped due to being 
sanctioned. The family, in effect, stepped 
in to make up for the loss of beneits which 
were needed for the minimum level of shelter 
and sustenance. Most often they extended 
support to participants in desperate 
circumstances, in buying food and covering 
gas and electricity costs, in the short term. 
However, reliance on family members, 
who were often inancially overstretched 
themselves, was far from desirable and 
came with an emotional cost. Priya puts 
into words the dificulty she had relying on 
her grandmother who was also struggling to 
make ends meet:
When I irst came in the hostel there was 
some pasta and some sauces and bits and 
bats off my nan…but it’s come to a point 
where they’re struggling and saying ‘you’ve 
got to get this sorted out’. (Priya).
Accepting hand-outs from family engendered 
a complex mixture of feelings: guilt and 
frustration at having to ask for help were not 
uncommon. In some cases there was also 
an awareness that their goodwill could not 
be relied on indeinitely. Ultimately, the strain 
it put on family relationships was signiicant. 
It led to arguments, relationship breakdown, 
and friendships turning sour:
My girlfriend’s parents, they fed me, 
gave me lifts everywhere […] ruined my 
relationship with them […] [My girlfriend] 
said ‘it would be best if you move out of 
my parents’ house’… (Martin)
My family got right tired of me ‘cos there’s 
only so much they could do. (Ross)
I borrowed off one of our pals […] but he 
changed so fast from all buddy buddy to  
“I need the f***ing money”. (Sonia) 
It is also worth noting here that family 
and friends can, in general terms, provide 
vital support to people experiencing 
homelessness. This is evident just from 
looking at the proportion of those surveyed 
who were staying with friends and family (20 
per cent of all homeless survey respondents). 
If being sanctioned is negatively affecting 
these relationships it could lead to the 
erosion of an important source of support 
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with potential long-term implications for 
levels of rough sleeping and demand on 
voluntary and statutory services.
More broadly, being at the receiving end 
of sanctions had an impact on individuals’ 
social relationships and their ability to stay 
connected, which were vital for the mental 
health of our participants. Maggie articulates 
how being cut off from her friends (she did 
not have the money to visit them as they lived 
some distance away) had made her more 
depressed, which in turn impacted on her 
ability to seek work.
All my friends were at Dinnington at the 
time, I had no friends over here, I used 
to go to Dinnington to see my friend, I 
couldn’t do that, that made me more 
depressed. (Maggie) 
Being sanctioned also had a serious and 
potentially long-term effect on individuals’ 
relationship with their children, and their 
ability to fulil their duties as a responsible 
parent. It affected the amount of time parents 
could spend with their children and, in some 
cases, whether they were able to do so at all. 
We have already seen that the demands 
placed upon respondents to meet 
conditionality requirements affected 
respondents’ parenting of their children. 
In Chapter 3, for example, we saw that 
William ‘pushed everything out of the way 
just to meet the target [for job applications], 
like going and seeing my kids’ (see Box 
3.1 in Chapter 3). William’s ex-partner 
subsequently refused to let him see his 
children because he failed to keep to the 
arrangements during the time he was trying 
to meet the conditions of his Claimant 
Commitment. Maggie, similarly described 
limited contact with her children because of 
the requirement to spend seven days a week 
job-seeking:
I couldn’t take my kids out as well cos 
you’re expected seven days a week to do it 
[job seeking], if you’ve got children, I mean 
my children don’t live with me but a lot of 
times I couldn’t take them out anywhere 
cos I had to be busy looking for work… I 
spent a bit of time with them, with kids, 
but it made it more dificult. (Maggie)
Once sanctioned, respondents were similarly 
unable to meet parenting commitments. At 
least four respondents (three fathers and one 
mother) were unable to see their children 
as a result of being sanctioned, with longer 
term consequences for their access to and 
relationship with those children. Having their 
beneit sanctioned left respondents without 
suficient funds to visit, feed, or take out their 
children and they had to cease or reduce 
contact as a result (see Anisa and Phillip’s in 
Box 7.2.) 
Ja’s moving account below gives some idea 
of the emotional ‘turmoil’ of foregoing contact 
with his son as a result of being unable to 
look after him properly (he couldn’t feed him 
and he had no heating or hot water, having 
disconnected his gas). Ja’s 10 year old son 
stayed with him every weekend but during 
the many months that Ja was sanctioned this 
was put under signiicant strain as Ja could 
not afford to feed him. Not wanting to tell 
his ex-partner or son about his sanction, Ja 
pretended all his money was going towards 
bills, and he borrowed money and food until 
all avenues were exhausted. Come the point 
when Ja’s cupboard was completely bare, 
his son would go home hungry and Ja faced 
accusations of neglect from his ex-partner. 
When Ja admitted he had been sanctioned, 
his son started bringing money to pay for his 
own food. Ja, in effect, became dependent 
upon his son bringing money to feed them 
both, a situation he could not tolerate and so 
the situation escalated until Ja ceased contact 
with his son for six months. The impact on 
Ja’s mental health has been discussed above. 
As he hints here, it had a signiicant impact 
on his relationship with his son and is a stark 
reminder that the impact of beneit sanctions 
extend well beyond the individual:
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Yeah so that’s when I had to… it’s not fair on 
him and it’s not fair on his mum, she can’t 
keep giving him money and stuff, she’s got 
her own stuff, so you have to make a decision, 
it’s not the right decision sometimes but 
when you’re in a turmoil and your mental 
health’s playing with you as well it’s like… 
yeah so for about six months we didn’t see 
each other, we’re just basically rebuilding now. 
(Ja) 
7.6 Increasing distance from the 
labour market: undermining efforts 
to seek work
We saw earlier in this chapter (see 7.1.) that 
sanctions did prompt respondents to more 
actively seek work and increase compliance 
with their conditionality requirements, which 
will include work-related activity such as 
attending training and courses, receiving 
help compiling CVs and generally preparing 
for work and improving employability (see 
Chapter 8 for discussion of the effectiveness 
of some of this support). Increased 
engagement was viewed positively by some 
and will have brought them closer to the 
labour market. 
However, perversely, the experience and 
detrimental impact of sanctions - and of 
the conditionality regime more generally 
was also found to push people further 
from the labour market, or decrease 
their chances of securing work. There 
was strong evidence to suggest that the 
conditionality and sanctions regime was 
mitigating against engagement with the 
labour market with the majority (60 per 
cent) of survey respondents reporting that 
being sanctioned had a negative effect on 
their ability to look for work. In addition, 
more than half (53 per cent) said it had 
negatively affected their ability to secure and/
or maintain a job; and 42 per cent reported 
that being sanctioned had a negative effect 
on their ability to continue with any training/
courses/groups they were on. 
The last of these points is important for, as we 
reported in Chapter 2, many homelessness 
service users were already taking steps to 
move closer to the labour market, often by 
drawing on the help of support workers or 
by attending courses and sessions offered 
by homelessness and other voluntary sector 
organisations. It is a perverse outcome 
indeed if the operation of a system designed 
to encourage more people to work in fact 
prevents them from continuing or embarking 
on the activities that will help them do so. 
Interview data suggest two principal reasons 
why respondents were unable to continue 
with their existing work-related activity: 
• The stress of being sanctioned and the 
practical efforts required to meet basic 
needs (access food, warmth, washing 
facilities and such like) sapped energy, 
motivation, and time (see Helena’s 
experience below); and
• Respondents travelling some distance to 
attend sessions could not afford travel costs. 
Participants who had been sanctioned also 
found that having to apply for jobs they 
were clearly not qualiied for, and had no 
hope of attaining, was another barrier to 
inding employment. Mandatory universal 
job searches, while time-consuming and 
frustrating, yielded almost no responses 
for the majority, let alone a job interview. 
The system appeared to be focused 
entirely on targets being met rather than an 
individualised job search tailored to each 
individual claimant. 
However, one of the clearest ways in which 
respondents were pushed further from the 
labour market by their experience of being 
sanctioned was through the detrimental 
impact of being sanctioned on mental 
health, physical health, self-esteem and 
well-being. We have already made the point 
above that deteriorating physical and, in 
particular, mental health as a result of being 
sanctioned was relatively common, yet 
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health is a key inluence on people’s labour 
market capabilities. We have reported 
fairly extensively on Ja’s experiences and 
circumstances already in this chapter. Here 
we can complete the picture by contrasting 
his ‘itness’ for work before his irst sanction 
and at the end of the 14 months during which 
he was sanctioned. 
When Ja irst claimed JSA less than 18 
months ago he had been working in a 
series of jobs for 15 years, including during 
a relatively long period of homelessness 
following the breakdown of his relationship. 
As we saw above (see Box 7.1) he had 
always been prone to bouts of depression 
but had managed these well enough 
to maintain his work, relationships and 
parenting. Ja had no support needs aside 
from this and was inally settled in a Housing 
Association lat he secured about two years 
ago. He had to leave his last job (a temporary 
job with the local authority on a zero hours 
contract) because of an injury and claimed 
JSA, imagining that as soon as he had 
recovered he would ind work again, as he 
always had done. The combined effect of a 
series of sanctions (for missed appointments 
for which Ja received no notiication) and 
confusion around an ESA claim left Ja with 
no income for 10 of the past 14 months. His 
Housing Beneit also stopped and at the 
time of his interview he was under threat of 
eviction. During this time his mental health 
deteriorated signiicantly, particularly after he 
had to cease contact with his son. Ja’s son is 
his only family and they are very close so this 
hit Ja very hard. He attempted suicide twice 
and suffered a stress-related heart attack 
(he is 36 years old). Ja is unlikely to be able 
to enter the labour market any time soon - a 
stark contrast with his situation when he 
signed on for the irst time in 15 years less 
than two years ago.
Box 7.1: The impact of sanctions on 
mental health
Ja says that ‘I always knew from being 20 odd 
year old that there was summat wrong with me’. 
He found himself feeling very depressed at times 
but managed his luctuating mood and periods 
of deep depression well, maintaining a relatively 
stable and contented life, despite a lengthy period 
of homelessness following the breakdown of his 
relationship. He continued working during this period 
and maintained a close relationship with his son. Ja 
eventually moved into a Housing Association lat and 
his son started staying with him most weekends. 
Following an accident he had to stop working 
while he recovered and signed on. He was soon 
sanctioned for failing to attend an appointment and 
then sanctioned again for the same reasons (he had 
not received the letters). During this time he also 
experienced disruption to his beneit because of 
confusion around moving from JSA to ESA. 
The stress of the situation - of having no money, 
of mounting debt (including to loan sharks), of the 
threat of losing his home (his HB stopped and his 
landlord instigated possession proceedings), and of 
trying to understand the details of his claim and his 
sanction so he could take appropriate action - had a 
signiicant effect on Ja’s mental health. When he had 
to stop seeing his son (he could not afford to feed 
him or heat his home when he stayed) he hit rock 
bottom. Ja described his descent into depression:
Yeah by this point it would have been March, April, 
May, going into June so then June, July no money 
still, no letters telling me why no money, I’ve gone 
into depression, what happens with me is cos I hate 
the world and sometimes all I do is bury my head 
and so I was no food, nothing, no eating, nothing 
for a time…I was getting really depressed, down in 
the dumps, no money coming in, what do I do? …
and then realised that I was getting worse… so we 
went up to the mental health team, they diagnosed 
me with bipolar and a disorder they called borderline 
personality disorder as well, BPD.
Since Ja was irst sanctioned less than 18 months 
ago he has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder 
and borderline personality disorder, has made two 
suicide attempts and has spent a period under 
section in a psychiatric hospital. Shortly before he 
was interviewed he had suffered a stress-related 
heart attack. Ja is 36 years old. 
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7.7 Debt
We noted in Chapter 5 that borrowing was 
a common way in which respondents met 
their daily needs whilst sanctioned. We 
need not go over that again here, but it 
is important to note that when money is 
borrowed, it becomes a debt. Combined with 
the (sometimes signiicant) rent and service 
charge arrears accrued by respondents as a 
result of their sanction (see above), increased 
indebtedness is, therefore, a key ‘unintended 
consequence’ of the sanctions regime. 
But this does not capture the extent of debt 
accrued. It was, for example, common for 
interview respondents living in their own 
tenancies to run up large water, gas and 
electricity bills. One respondent explained 
that he disconnected his gas - which was 
metered - because even if he used none 
a ‘standing’ charge was made, but his 
electricity was billed and so he continued 
usage. Most tenants, even those in receipt 
of full Council Tax Beneit, now have to pay a 
proportion of their Council Tax. 
These debts remain, of course, once the 
sanction is lifted. Allowing rent arrears or 
electricity charges to accrue, or borrowing 
from friends as a way of ‘getting through’ a 
sanction may help in the short-term but has 
long term inancial consequences. When 
he was interviewed, Ja had just received a 
letter saying his beneit was being reinstated 
but the amount he was to receive was much 
reduced because a sum was being taken as 
a direct deduction from his beneit to meet 
an arrangement with his landlord to repay the 
£1000 rent arrears he had accrued. This will 
make life very dificult for Ja who also has 
loan sharks knocking on his door, water and 
utility bills unpaid and furniture and white 
goods that need replacing (he sold them all).
It is also important to highlight that sanctions 
prevent people from maintaining repayment 
arrangements for existing debt, and other 
inancial commitments. This includes 
payments for rent arrears (failing to keep up 
with such arrangements can result in eviction) 
Council Tax and court ines (failure to pay 
these can result in a custodial sentence), as 
well as maintenance payments, loans and 
credit payments. 
Although not a widespread practice, some 
respondents did take out high interest 
loans as a way of coping while sanctioned 
(19 per cent of those surveyed). Interview 
respondents generally recognised that 
such loans would have to be paid back at 
extortionate rates and would only make their 
inancial situation worse in the long-run but, 
nevertheless, at least two took a loan from 
unregulated and/or high interest lenders. 
These respondents had been without any 
income for so long that their inancial situation 
forced them to take desperate measures:
I had to take out a Provident Loan because 
I’ve no money. But it’s not just 2 per cent; 
it’s like 100 per cent. But I had to take it 
because I had no money. (Douglas)
7.8 Key points 
• The core objective of the conditionality 
and sanctions regime is to support 
more people into work. Government 
rationale for the use of sanctions is that 
Box 7.2: Impact of sanctions on 
parenting and contact with children
Phillip has an arrangement to see his one year 
old son once a week, visiting him at home in a 
neighbouring town. When Phillip was sanctioned for 
being 15 minutes late to sign on he could no longer 
afford the weekly train fare. Initially, Phillip ‘jumped 
the train’, travelling without a ticket, but he was 
caught and ined, a ine he has no way of paying by 
the deadline, and so he daren’t risk that again.
Anisa has a four year old daughter who lives with 
her father. Anisa is currently living in a hostel 
where children are prohibited from visiting and 
so when she sees her daughter she has to take 
her out. This proved very dificult while Anisa 
was sanctioned, unless she could borrow money 
- which she occasionally could - to take her 
daughter out.
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they are effective in changing behaviour 
that will, in turn, reduce unemployment. 
The evidence from this study suggests 
that the sanctions regime does prompt 
some behavioural change, making 
homelessness service users more 
likely to comply with the conditions set 
down for them and seek work. However, 
being sanctioned also had a series of 
‘unintended’ impacts on respondents’ lives.
• There is evidence that being sanctioned 
is having a signiicant detrimental impact 
on people’s housing situations – those 
already homeless and those in their 
own accommodation – resulting in 
homelessness for some. Overall 21 per 
cent of sanctioned respondents said 
they became homeless as a result of the 
sanction. In part, this is because for some 
claimants Housing Beneit ceases to be 
paid when they are sanctioned, or people 
can no longer make up the HB shortfall 
with JSA/ESA income. 
• Sanctions exacerbated mental and 
physical health problems in an already 
vulnerable population. Three quarters of 
the survey respondents who had been 
sanctioned said this had a negative impact 
on their mental health.
• Perversely, the experience and detrimental 
impact of sanctions - and of the 
conditionality regime more generally - 
was found to push some people further 
from the labour market, or decrease their 
chances of securing work. 60 per cent of 
survey respondents reported that being 
sanctioned had a negative effect on their 
ability to look for work and more than half 
(53 per cent) said it had negatively affected 
their ability to secure and/or maintain a job.
• Beneit sanctions can have an impact 
that extends far beyond the individual, 
fracturing relationships with friends, family, 
and children - relationships that in some 
cases are a crucial source of support to 
people while they are homeless.
Box 7.3. Impact of sanctions: limiting 
opportunities for work, education and 
training 
Helena had been ‘working on courses, I was 
really working hard on them, and a lot more than 
I think work club is going to help me’ at a local 
homelessness centre but she ceased this activity 
when she was sanctioned because ‘I was so 
distressed I couldn’t manage myself anymore’. 
Her engagement with this homelessness 
organisation shifted from training courses and 
employment-related activity to meetings with a 
support worker to deal with the impact of her 
sanction (appeal, HB issues and such like).
Kyle missed out on a job opportunity because 
he could not afford to keep his mobile phone 
operational while he was sanctioned. Phones, and 
phone credit was considered a luxury and was 
often last respondents’ list of priorities, making 
job searching and the chance of securing work 
very dificult. Kyle explained what happened to him:
I lost a trial shift in the ‘Frog and Parrot’, a restaurant. 
They said they tried to phone me and my phone was 
off and they hired someone else. It was a 28 hour 
kitchen porter job and it’s not far away so that would 
have been good cos my hostel’s just in town, I could 
have been there in 10 minutes.
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The evidence presented in this report begins 
to ill a crucial gap in the evidence base on 
beneit sanctions, generating robust evidence 
on the prevalence of sanctions amongst 
homeless people and their experiences 
of welfare conditionality. The results lend 
support to evidence already accumulated 
suggesting that homeless and vulnerable 
people are more likely to be sanctioned than 
the wider claimant population.
This is, perhaps, no surprise: many 
homelessness service users have 
vulnerabilities that make it dificult for them 
to navigate the rigidity and bureaucracy 
of any formal system, have a multitude of 
other commitments and concerns (seeking 
and applying for housing, appointments 
with drug advisors, health workers and 
support workers), and do not always have 
the resources necessary to ‘play by the rules’ 
(regular access to the internet, a reliable 
postal address, suitable clothes). However, 
the system is designed to account for 
variation in circumstances and capabilities, 
with conditionality requirements supposedly 
adjusted accordingly to create a level 
playing ield, ensuring that more vulnerable 
people are not placed at a disadvantage 
and exposed to greater risk of sanction. It 
is designed to provide tailored support and 
assistance to help even those with signiicant 
barriers to labour market participation to 
improve their skills, conidence, and improve 
their opportunity and capability to work.
Yet this was not the experience of many of 
those participating in this study. In fact, some 
respondents’ encounters with the beneit 
system pushed them further from, not closer 
to the labour market, as the stress of trying 
to comply with impossible requirements, or 
cope with being sanctioned, took its toll on 
respondents’ mental and physical health, and 
respondents were prevented from continuing 
with meaningful work-related activity to attend 
courses that did little to improve their skills. 
The results from this study have signiicant 
implications for welfare policy. It is clear that, 
however well-intentioned the conditionality 
and sanctions regime and associated 
support and assistance, it is not working 
well for homelessness service users. Their 
capabilities appear misunderstood such 
that requirements placed upon them 
are inappropriate and almost certain to 
result eventually in a sanction. They are 
certainly not always ‘reasonable… relecting 
the claimant’s particular capability and 
circumstances’ as policy dictates. The fact so 
many homelessness service users are being 
sanctioned (39 per cent) strongly suggests 
that sanctions are not working as a ‘deterrent 
threat’ for this client group. It is also clear 
from the evidence that few homelessness 
service users are sanctioned because they 
‘refuse to play by the rules’. Rather, they are 
hampered by a system that places unrealistic 
demands upon them, that fails to recognise 
and account for their circumstances and 
vulnerabilities, and that practises little 
discretion or lexibility. As we have seen, 
many sanctions occurred not because of 
‘behavioural failings’ but because of systemic 
problems and inappropriate requirements 
that far exceeded respondents’ capabilities 
and circumstances. In fact, many of the 
homelessness service users participating in 
this research had just the kind of disposition 
to work that welfare policy seeks to engender. 
The consequence is that people who are 
already vulnerable, or experiencing dificulties 
in their life, have vital support removed at a 
time they most need it, plunging them into 
debt, homelessness and poor health all of 
which impact on their capacity to work in the 
future. 
We suggest that for a system of conditionality 
to be effective for this client group, to 
promote genuine efforts to help homeless 
people move closer to the labour market and 
achieve their aspirations, and to mitigate 
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against the unintended consequences of 
sanctioning (e.g. homelessness, deteriorating 
mental health, increased labour market 
detachment) the following changes and 
measures are required. The need for these 
changes is well evidenced by the results of 
this study. Some of these recommendations 
have relevance beyond homeless and 
vulnerable people.
Recommendations:
We suggest that for a system of conditionality 
to be effective for this client group, to 
promote genuine efforts to help homeless 
people move closer to the labour market and 
achieve their aspirations, and to mitigate 
against the unintended consequences of 
sanctioning the following changes and 
measures are required.
1.  DWP must ensure sanctions do not 
result in claimants’ Housing Beneit 
being stopped, and report on progress 
in resolving this issue
2. Conditionality requirements should be 
suspended until housing issues are 
resolved:
 > DWP should extend the current 
‘easement’ rules on conditionality to 
anyone who is homeless, until their 
housing situation is resolved. 
 > Work Coaches should be required 
to ascertain whether an individual is 
homeless or at risk of homelessness so 
that the easement can be applied. 
3. Work Coaches and contracted 
providers should exercise greater 
leniency when inancial sanctions are 
likely to put an individual at risk of 
homelessness or destitution
 > DWP should introduce a new inancial 
assessment for Jobcentre Plus decision 
makers to deliver before a inancial 
sanction can be issued. 
 > Contracted providers of employment 
support programmes should be given 
greater freedoms not to raise a doubt 
over a sanctionable offence when 
deemed inappropriate to supporting a 
homeless person into work; and DWP 
should issue guidance on what might 
constitute a ‘vulnerable’ person.
 > DWP should introduce a ‘warning 
system’ for a irst failure to comply 
with conditionality requirements 
for claimants with a history of 
homelessness, in place of a sanction. 
4. Employment support and conditionality  
requirements should be better tailored 
for people who are homeless or at risk 
of homelessness
 > The DWP commissioning framework, 
and future devolved commissioning 
models in Scotland and via city 
deals, should incorporate an in-
depth assessment process that takes 
into account the barriers homeless 
people, or those at risk of becoming 
homelessness, face. 
 > DWP should introduce a uniform set 
of service standards across Jobcentre 
Plus and contracted out provision 
to ensure high quality services are 
delivered and homeless people receive 
the support needed to overcome 
speciic barriers to work.
 > Providers of employment support 
provision, including Jobcentre 
Plus, should include housing and 
homelessness specialists within their 
delivery model. 
 > DWP guidance on the Claimant 
Commitment should clearly state 
that jobseeking activities should be 
co-designed between the claimant 
and Work Coach, and reviewed on an 
ongoing basis. 
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 > Work Coaches and contracted 
providers should capitalise on the 
positive efforts claimants are already 
making to improve employability by 
supporting their engagement with the 
voluntary sector to access support, 
courses or volunteering opportunities.  
5. DWP must fully evaluate the 
effectiveness of conditionality and 
sanctions in moving people into the 
labour market
 >  DWP should commission a review 
of the effectiveness of the current 
conditionality and sanctions 
regime, including evaluation of the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of 
the regime in supporting homeless 
claimants into work.
 > DWP should formally report on progress 
in meeting the recommendations of the 
Oakley review. 
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Appendix 1
Name Summary of reason for sanctions32 
Adam Adam was sanctioned for failing to do the requisite job searching. He was actively seeking work but 
was doing so by delivering CVs in person. His Claimant Commitment speciied he must job search 
online only. Adam is not IT proicient. 
Alistair Alistair was sanctioned for failing to attend the Work Programme. He had been placed in the WRAG 
but was disputing his classiication and wrongly thought this exempted him. He is diagnosed with 
schizophrenia and has had drug and alcohol problems since his wife passed away a few years ago. 
Amrit Amrit was sanctioned for failing to attend the Work Programme. He had attended the same course 
(a ‘Level 1’ forklift course) previously and had not found it useful in terms of getting a job. He was 
keen, and had asked to do a higher level course but saw little point in repeating the basic course. 
He tried negotiating with his Work Coach on this point but to no avail.
Anisa Anisa was sanctioned for failing to sign on. When told on a Thursday that her irst signing date was 
Friday she assumed, wrongly, it would be the following week rather than the next day. As soon as 
she realised her mistake she contacted the Jobcentre.
Benjamin Benjamin was sanctioned for failing to undertake the required level of job search. He had, in fact, 
satisied the job search requirements but could not prove all of this activity because he had been 
asking for work in shops but had no formal record of this. 
Brian Brian is claiming ESA WRAG and failed to attend an appointment at the Work Programme. He 
understood from the beneits advisor that he didn’t have to attend. 
David David was sanctioned for four weeks for failing to attend an appointment at JCP. David did not 
receive the letter informing him of his appointment.
Dennis Dennis was sanctioned for not fulilling his job search requirements. Dennis had fulilled his job 
search criteria and had kept fastidious records (350 in the month the sanction was applied). Dennis 
was sanctioned twice more for the same reason. Dennis successfully appealed against each of 
these decisions.
Douglas Douglas was sanctioned for failing to attend an appointment. He had not received the letter. 
Faye Faye was sanctioned for failing to attend the Work Programme. She had been unwell that day and 
had informed her Work Programme Provider by telephone of this.  
Fred Emergency childcare issues prevented Fred from signing on. He was asked at short notice to 
collect his daughter from school because his older daughter had gone into labour and her mother 
wanted to be at the hospital with her. He went in person to the Jobcentre the next day to explain. 
He had previously been sanctioned for failing to do the required job search online. Robert is not 
computer literate so was doing his computer searching with the help a worker at a local day centre 
but could not get enough time with the worker to fulil his conditions.
Helena Helena was sanctioned for failing to attend the Work Programme. Full details (directions, map, 
telephone number) were not provided, although the letter indicated they would be, so she did not 
know where to go. She contacted the Jobcentre and they promised to send her full details but when 
the second letter arrived this information was missing again.
Ja Ja was sanctioned twice for failing to attend appointments for which he had received no notiication.
Joe Joe was sanctioned for failing to meet his job search requirements.  He was clinically depressed at 
the time and had no motivation to seek work. He fully acknowledged that he ‘couldn’t be bothered’ 
to meet his conditions. A few months later he was deemed unit for work and awarded ESA 
because of his mental health issues. 
Jonathan Jonathan was sanctioned for four weeks for not looking for appropriate jobs. He had done the 
requisite job search but had applied for some jobs in his trade (race horse handling) that were not 
speciied on his Claimant Commitment.
32 Respondents had often been sanctioned more than once. In interviews we concentrated on their most recent sanction but sometimes have infor-
mation about previous sanctions also. These are sometimes used as examples elsewhere in the report and so will not always match the reasons 
for sanctions presented in this table.
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Kyle Kyle forgot to sign on and was sanctioned. He realised his mistake the following day and went to 
the Jobcentre. 
Lee Lee has had three sanctions, all for missing appointments. Lee has been very ill during this time, 
with cancer amongst other things, but has struggled to get the necessary medical evidence (mainly 
through being too ill to pursue it) to prove he was too unwell to attend.
Lewis Lewis was sanctioned for failing to attend the Work Programme. Lewis did not attend because 
he had a job interview. He informed the Work Programme Provider of this but did not inform the 
Jobcentre and so was sanctioned. He successfully appealed. 
Luke Luke was sanctioned for missing an appointment. He was in hospital at the time having been 
assaulted. 
Maggie Maggie was sanctioned because she missed an appointment. She had just moved, becoming 
homeless because of an arson attack on her home. She informed the Jobcentre, but the letter was 
sent to her previous address. She was sanctioned again for failing to do the requisite job search. 
Maggie really struggled with the requirements. A few months later she was deemed unit for work 
and awarded ESA. 
Martin Martin was sanctioned for failing to sign on. He informed the Jobcentre that he would be away 
Friday to Sunday (his signing on day was Friday) and was told to come and sign on on Monday 
instead. Martin was prepared to lose a proportion of his beneit for being unavailable for work while 
away but when he went on Monday he was told he was sanctioned. 
Matthew Matthew was sanctioned several times for failing to attend the Work Programme. He cares for his 
partner who has mental health problems and, because of this, he inds it dificult to consistently attend. 
Melanie Melanie was sanctioned because she forgot to sign on. She is 18 years old and was being evicted 
that day from the hostel where she had been living since leaving care. 
Pete Pete missed an appointment to sign on. He has numeracy and literacy issues so did not understand 
the electronic claim system.
Phillip Phillip was sanctioned for being late (15 minutes) for signing on, having been stuck in trafic. 
Priya Priya was sanctioned for missing an appointment. She did not receive the letter informing her of the 
appointment, possibly because she was in the process of moving.
Rick Rick was sanctioned for failing to meet job search requirements. He had met his conditions but had 
not completed his booklet to prove it. 
Ross Ross missed an appointment due to confusion about the location. He went to the wrong ofice, was 
told he had no appointment there, contacted his advisor immediately and was told his appointment 
was elsewhere, but once he arrived he had missed his allotted time. 
Shawn Shawn was sanctioned for not completing adequate job search. He has drug issues and found it 
too dificult to meet the requirements. 
Simon Simon was sanctioned for failing to do the requisite job searching. Simon has poor literacy and had 
dificulties understanding his Claimant Commitment. 
Sonia Sonia is not entirely sure why she was sanctioned but thinks she missed an appointment. At the 
time she had drug dependency issues and was living a chaotic life.
Stan Stan was sanctioned (twice) for failing to attend appointments. On both occasions he got the dates 
confused and attended at the wrong time. He had alcohol issues at the time. 
Vincent Vincent was sanctioned for not responding to a letter concerning his ID. He did not receive the 
letter.
Thomas Thomas was sanctioned for failing to sign on at his irst signing on date. He had forgotten, not yet 
being in the routine of claiming beneits.
Tim Tim has been sanctioned for missing appointments and for failing to do the requisite job search. Tim 
was sleeping rough and has mental health issues and found these requirements too dificult to meet. 
Soon after he was deemed unit for work and awarded ESA, being placed in the Support Group. 
William William was sanctioned for failing to apply for enough jobs. He has borderline learning dificulties, 
mental ill health and poor computer literacy. A couple of months later William made a successful 
claim for ESA and was placed in the Support Group.
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Survey method
The survey was conducted in day centres 
for homeless people and in homeless 
hostels across England and Scotland. 
CRESR designed the survey, including the 
questionnaire, and undertook the analysis 
of the resultant dataset. The ieldwork was 
undertaken, managed and data entered by the 
professional survey company Qa Research. 
The questionnaire was administered face-
to-face by professional interviewers with 
respondents in situ at each of the service 
providers within the sample. All service 
providers had been contacted, informed of 
the research and agreed to facilitate access 
to service users prior to the interview team 
arriving. All attendees at the service provider 
on one particular day were informed of the 
research and asked if they wished to take 
part in the survey. The ieldwork took place 
between February and April 2015.
A short screener was irst administered to 
all respondents willing to take part to ensure 
all were of ‘working age’ in beneit terms 
(i.e. aged 16-64) and exclude those who 
were not eligible for beneits because of their 
immigration status. People not currently 
homeless were eligible to participate on the 
basis that their use of a homelessness service 
indicated a recent history of homelessness, 
a very precarious housing situation, or threat 
of homelessness. All survey respondents 
received a £5 ‘thank you’ payment. On 
average the questionnaire typically took 15-20 
minutes to administer. The data was entered 
onto and analysed using SPSS. 
The sampling frame of service providers 
was chosen to cover a range of different 
types of locality, service types and providers 
in order to generate a large and robust 
sample. The sample relects a cross section 
of homeless people living in different 
housing and geographical contexts and is 
not skewed unduly by speciic or unique 
conditions in certain types of places. In 
all, 39 homelessness service providers 
across 22 districts in ten regions agreed to 
take part in the survey. The districts were 
Birmingham, Liverpool, Bradford, Brighton, 
Bristol, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Hull, Lambeth, 
Lancaster, Leeds, Leicester, Manchester, 
Newcastle, North East Lincolnshire, Perth, 
Rotherham, Salford, Shefield, Warwick, 
Westminster and York. 
In total, 1,013 usable interviews with 
respondents aged 16-64 were completed. 
831 (82 per cent) with men and 182 with 
women (18 per cent). It is not possible to 
compare this igure directly with the gender 
proile for the entire GB population of service 
users of day centres and homeless hostels 
as this data does not exist. However, the 
2011 Census does allow a gender proile of 
GB residents of working age in hostels for 
homeless or temporary shelters on Census 
night to be compared to those within the 
survey sample who were interviewed at drop 
in/night shelters or hostels - which accounted 
for 30 per cent of the overall sample. The 
gender proile for this sub sample was 72:28 
males to females which is very close to the 
69:31 ratio of males to females seen in the 
comparable group in the 2011 Census. This 
gives conidence that the sample is broadly 
representative of the gender split seen in the 
population of service users as a whole.
The age proile of the sub-sample within 
hostels and night/shelters was also broadly 
comparable to what is known of this 
population in the 2011 Census. Half of this 
sub-sample were aged 16-34, 34 per cent 
were aged 35-49 and 16 per cent were aged 
50 or over. The comparable igures from the 
census were 64 per cent, 25 per cent and 
10 per cent respectively. The sub-sample 
of working aged respondents interviewed 
at drop in/night shelters or hostels within 
the survey is therefore only slightly older 
than was seen in the 2011 Census. When 
the entire sample of 1,013 is considered, 
Statistical Appendix 2
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this indicates an older age proile is seen 
amongst the users of day centres. This 
means for the sample of as a whole: 34 per 
cent were aged 16-34, 44 per cent were aged 
35-49 and 22 per cent were aged over 50. 
Full sample 1,013
Beneits status 
Claiming any beneits (currently or in past year) 
JSA* 
ESA WRAG* 
All subject to conditionality
 
961 
338 
213 
548
Mental health 
JSA with mental health problems 
JSA without mental health problems 
ESA WRAG with mental health problems 
ESA WRAG without mental health problems 
All subject to conditionality with mental health problems 
All subject to conditionality without mental health problems
 
96 
242 
153 
60 
246 
302
Alcohol or drug dependency issues 
JSA with alcohol or drug dependency issues 
JSA without alcohol or drug dependency issues 
ESA WRAG with alcohol or drug dependency issues 
ESA WRAG without alcohol or drug dependency issues 
All subject to conditionality with alcohol or drug dependency issues 
All subject to conditionality without alcohol or drug dependency issues
 
139 
199 
149 
64 
286 
262
Circumstances of those subject to conditionality 
All subject to conditionality and been in local authority care 
All subject to conditionality with physical health problems or a disability 
All subject to conditionality and experienced violence/abuse from a parent 
All subject to conditionality and experienced violence/abuse from a partner 
All subject to conditionality with problems reading or writing 
All subject to conditionality and sleeping rough at time of survey
 
132 
217 
132 
143 
136 
85
Claimants sanctioned 
JSA claimants sanctioned in past year 
ESA WRAG claimants sanctioned in past year 
All claimants sanctioned in past year
 
130 
85 
213
Meeting conditionality 
All subject to conditionality and inding it dificult to meet conditions 
All subject to conditionality and not inding it dificult to meet conditions 
JSA claimants inding it dificult to meet conditions 
ESA WRAG claimants inding it dificult to meet conditions 
All subject to conditionality and aware that not meeting conditions can lead to being 
sanctioned
 
295 
173 
176 
121 
512
Housing Beneit 
All claiming housing beneit when sanctioned 
JSA claimants that were claiming HB when sanctioned 
ESA WRAG claimants that were claiming HB when sanctioned
 
146 
88 
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Sample sizes
In total, 1,013 single homelessness service users aged 16-64 were surveyed between February and April 2015. 
*3 respondents reported they claimed JSA and ESA.  This may be due to changing beneits status over the past 
year.  These respondents were included within the JSA and ESA sub-samples, but only counted once within the 
subject to conditionality group.
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